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And I say that life is indeed darkness save when there is urge,
And all urge is blind save when there is knowledge,
And all knowledge is vain save when there is work,
And all work is empty save when there is love.
– The Prophet, by Kahlil Gibran, 1923
To my parents and teachers
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ABSTRACT
Modern computer systems still have various security and reliability vulnerabilities. Well-known
dynamic analyses solutions can mitigate them using runtime monitors that serve as lifeguards. But
the additional work in enforcing these security and safety properties incurs exorbitant performance
costs, and such tools are rarely used in practice. Our work addresses this problem by constructing
a novel technique- Cautiously Optimistic Program Analysis (COPA).
COPA is optimistic- it infers likely program invariants from dynamic observations, and as-
sumes them in its static reasoning to precisely identify and elide wasteful runtime monitors. The
resulting system is fast, but also ensures soundness by recovering to a conservatively optimized
analysis when a likely invariant rarely fails at runtime. COPA is also cautious- by carefully re-
stricting optimizations to only safe elisions, the recovery is greatly simplified. It avoids unbounded
rollbacks upon recovery, thereby enabling analysis for live production software.
We demonstrate the effectiveness of Cautiously Optimistic Program Analyses in three areas–
• Information-Flow Tracking (IFT) can help prevent security breaches and information leaks.
But they are rarely used in practice due to their high performance overhead (> 500% for web/e-
mail servers). COPA dramatically reduces this cost by eliding wasteful IFT monitors to make it
practical (∼ 9% overhead – 4× speedup).
ix
• Automatic Garbage Collection (GC) in managed languages (e.g. Java) simplifies program-
ming tasks while ensuring memory safety. However, there is no correct GC for weakly-typed
languages (e.g. C/C++), and manual memory management is prone to errors that have been
exploited in high profile attacks. We develop the first sound GC for C/C++, and use COPA to
optimize its performance (∼ 16% overhead).
• Sequential Consistency (SC) provides intuitive semantics to concurrent programs that simplifies
reasoning for their correctness. However, ensuring SC behavior on commodity hardware remains
expensive. We use COPA to ensure SC for Java at the language-level efficiently, and significantly
reduce its cost (from ∼ 24% down to ∼ 5% on x86).





Software is everywhere– from controlling critical infrastructure to democratizing technology for
the masses. The very essential backbones of our industrial, financial, healthcare, education and
government systems are built in its realm. Today, it not only manages our modern society, but
sometimes drives aspects of its progress. Given this, ensuring that these systems are secure and
reliable is critical.
And yet, we continue hearing such news as losing identities and information of millions of
users to security breaches, and losing billions of dollars to system downtimes, and so on. As
software have evolved, it has simultaneously grown in complexity as well as its demand for per-
formance. Even advanced industrial computing machinery has been limited to meet this demand.
Since systems cannot tolerate under-performance, this unfortunately means that strong security
and reliability measures are deliberately disabled due to their prohibitive costs.
This dissertation seeks to improve the security and reliability of software systems. Some ad-
ditional work in maintaining or monitoring for these properties is fundamentally unavoidable.
But redundant costs can be eliminated by carefully reasoning and constructing analyses, that use
optimistic assumptions, dynamic information, and careful reasoning to induce more precise and
stronger optimizations. We develop a novel program analysis technique and demonstrate its prac-
tical value in designing more secure and reliable compiler and programming language runtime
support tools. This enables many powerful program analyses that provide stronger guarantees at
practical costs.
1
1.1 Need for Secure & Reliable Software
The following discussion presents a brief summary of our work along three different areas.
Always-on security monitoring
Data breaches and inadvertent leaks recur increasingly often, causing tangible damages and that to
our trust in technology. Why then are systems not running always with the necessary checks? Per-
formance considerations often preclude continuous runtime monitoring of production software, as
even simple dynamic analyses incur prohibitively large overheads. Static reasoning can help avoid
some of the unnecessary work by proving that some program operations can not ever cause poten-
tially insecure behaviors. But such reasoning is fundamentally conservative, becoming too slow
and often not completing for real programs. Even when it finishes, the results are too imprecise and
thus ineffective in practice. Optimistic hybrid analysis (OHA) [1] uses likely program invariants
to predicate static analysis, making it more precise and thereby effective in inducing more aggres-
sive optimizations that reduce dynamic analysis overheads. However, one key challenge remained-
how to guarantee analysis soundness in the rare event that an assumed invariant is dynamically vio-
lated. Rollbacks, although address this problem for offline analysis, are intolerable on live running
software as it may require re-running years of execution history, and moreover, effects of certain
operations are irreversible. We solve this rollback problem in our Cautiously Optimistic Program
Analysis (COPA) to apply it for the first time on live systems. An optimistically optimized anal-
ysis can reason two types of optimizations- (1) it can remove an analysis monitor operation that
provably does not modify the analysis metadata state, we call these noop monitors; and (2) it
can remove a monitor that although updates the analysis metadata but does not affect the analysis
outcome. We prove that removing the noop monitors are safe elisions as they maintain the exact
metadata state as in a conservative analysis. We construct rollback-free COPA to only perform
safe elisions, so that upon an invariant failure, the analysis simply performs forward recovery by
switching to the conservatively optimized analysis. This allows us to apply COPA for live security
monitoring of web / mail / database servers that require such soundness guarantees, significantly
improving the overhead (to ∼ 9%) of enforcing information flow security.
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Safe runtime systems for legacy languages
A large number of contemporary high-performance software are being developed in unsafe lan-
guages like C/C++. Since these languages do not provide a managed memory, such systems remain
vulnerable to security threats and reliability issues. However, the cost of providing a safe runtime
with a managed memory remains high for these legacy systems since reasoning for safety is much
harder under their weak language-level semantics. Garbage Collection (GC) is a useful language
feature that automatically enforces temporal memory safety of programs, prevents memory leaks,
and at the same time alleviates programmers from the burden of explicitly reasoning about mem-
ory management. Prior works that attempted to import this language feature to C essentially rely
on value-based heuristics to identify pointers (memory allocation addresses) at runtime. But, le-
gal C programs can violate type-safety and manipulate pointer values, so that pointers’ values no
longer identify their referent memory objects. Therefore, such value-based approaches are un-
sound and can incorrectly reclaim memory objects that are still reachable. How could the runtime
system correctly identify such hidden pointers? Although it is hard to identify, pointer informa-
tion has well-defined sources (memory allocation functions). So, we construct the first sound GC
for C that is provenance-based, essentially tracking all values that are derived from pointers. A
naive approach would incur significant overheads in tracking pointers through all explicit and im-
plicit channels. So, we leverage optimistic analysis, and apply targeted reasoning to identify most
common pointer operations that would not propagate sufficient pointer information and would not
entail dynamic tracking. We additionally identify optimizations induced by spatial memory safety
of programs with well-defined behavior and properties of the C language standards. This enables
us to realize a sound GC solution for C with practical overheads (∼ 16%). Our provenance-based
GC tool is sound, and it improves the scanning overheads and memory reclamation rate compared
to state-of-the-art value-based GC for C. We show that legacy systems written in weakly-typed
languages can be provided temporal memory safety at practical costs.
3
Language guarantees for concurrent programs
Modern high-performance computing applications rely on languages providing useful abstractions
for concurrency to leverage the inherent parallelisms in the application. The memory consistency
model defines the correct behavior of such concurrent programs by dictating the allowable or-
derings among accesses to shared memory from different threads of the program. While strong
memory models provide simple and intuitive semantics, thereby simplifying reasoning for pro-
gram correctness and debugging tasks, they prevent aggressive memory reordering optimizations
by the compiler and underlying hardware thus incurring a high runtime performance cost. Conse-
quently, the current language standards for widely-used C++ and Java provide strong consistency
semantics only for data-race-free programs, where all conflicting shared memory accesses are al-
ready strictly ordered by the program’s synchronization needs. The vast majority of programs with
data races run with weak or no guarantees. This can lead to concurrency bugs with obscure be-
haviors, making it very difficult for programmers to reason for correctness. We seek to close this
semantic gap and provide a strong memory consistency model- Sequential Consistency (SC), at the
language-level for all programs. While prior work has explored static program analysis and spec-
ulative compilation techniques to bring down the runtime cost of enforcing SC for all programs,
these solutions remain inadequate due to the ineffectiveness of applying inherently conservative
analyses in their optimizations. The compiler can statically identify potential data-races and then
protect only such memory accesses with expensive fence operations to enforce the SC orderings
at runtime. However, traditional static data race analyses are imprecise and are not able to prove
many memory accesses to be data-race-free. We construct an optimistic data-race analysis that
is significantly more precise, reporting 84% fewer potential races. The resulting SC-compiler for
Java, using this precise analysis, thus emits much fewer fences and enforces SC at only ∼ 5%
runtime overhead on commodity x86 hardware. We also improve upon the recovery mechanism of
our COPA to leverage the just-in-time compilation features of the Java virtual machine.
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1.2 Traditional Program Analyses Landscape
We present the relevant background on existing program analyses techniques, discuss their limita-
tions, and motivate the challenges. Traditionally, program analyses situate along two contrasting
ends– Static or Dynamic analyses.
Static Analyses use known properties of the programming language and reason across mod-
els or representations of the program in order to prove certain properties that hold for the entire
program for all its possible executions. They attempt to be sound1 by reasoning correctly for all
possible program executions. But on the downside, characterizing possible program behaviors is
generally undecidable, and so these techniques employ conservative approximations that generally
make them imprecise thereby proving weaker properties, and becoming too slow to be practical.
Dynamic Analyses augment actual executions to track useful metadata and check or enforce
properties only for the monitored executions. They attempt to be precise by only reasoning for
program states encountered during the monitored execution and avoiding conservative approxima-
tions with dynamic observations. Dynamic analyses are widely useful in detecting well-known
bug patterns, concurrency bugs, mitigate security attacks, enforce privacy policies, and even dy-
namically re-optimize programs. But on the downside, they incur overheads in performing the
additional analysis work and can slow down programs significantly. So, their use is limited to
offline retroactive debugging and not for online continuous monitoring.
Next, we discuss the directions in which static and dynamic analyses can be combined to
overcome the shortcomings of each other. This design space is illustrated in Fig. 1.1.
Hybrid Analyses are a common approach to improve the efficiency of dynamic analyses by
using static analyses. They first perform a sound static analysis, and then use the results of that
analysis to induce optimizations that elide unnecessary or redundant dynamic analysis checks.
For example, CCured [3] enforces memory safety for C dynamically at runtime, but uses static
type inference to remove the vast majority of memory checks and only dynamically checking
1Static analyses for modern languages with dynamic features attempt to be soundy [2] and do not account for
behaviors that are hard to characterize statically, e.g. dynamic dispatch and class loading in Java.
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those accesses for which the static type inference fails. Hybrid analysis has been used to optimize
dynamic race detectors [4], taint tracking systems [5], and enforce memory safety at runtime [6, 7].
However, traditional sound static analyses have a fundamental limitation– in order to be sound,
they become over-conservative in assuming all possible program states. This often leads to unac-
ceptable imprecision in reasoning that is inadequate in effectively reducing the dynamic overheads.
Blended Analyses work in the other direction to improve the precision of static analyses by
using light-weight dynamic analyses. They combine the results of a fast dynamic analysis over
several executions to construct a dynamic program structure representation, which can then be
used by the static analysis to significantly reduce its scope and induce more precise reasoning.
This approach has enabled useful static analyses like reasoning for web-based frameworks [8, 9],
program slicing of large complex programs [10], and taint analysis [11]. A few systems also use
the more precise static analysis to accelerate a final dynamic analysis [12, 13].
Unfortunately, the initial dynamic analysis being unsound, the resulting static analysis is also
unsound which these systems fail to compensate for. As a result, these systems provide much
























Figure 1.1: Program analyses landscape
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Optimistic Hybrid Analysis (OHA) improves traditional analyses in both directions. It first
learns useful properties about programs’ dynamic behaviors from several profiling runs and uses
these likely invariants to carefully predicate the static analysis. The more precise static analy-
sis induces stronger optimizations on the final dynamic analysis. Importantly, OHA solves the
unsoundness introduced during static analysis with speculative execution, identifying when an in-
variant actually fails during any execution and then recovering to a sound conservatively optimized
analysis. This approach has enabled highly optimized solutions to program slicing and data-race
detection [1].
However, the key question in applying OHA is how to recover analysis soundness when an
assumed likely invariant fails. Because invariant violations are quite rare, prior work relies on a
rollback recovery approach. Upon an invariant violation, the optimistic analysis is rolled-back and
a conservative hybrid analysis is re-executed. However, this approach can suffer from unbounded
rollbacks, because a whole-program analysis can induce optimizations as far back as at the be-
ginning of the program. This severely limits its application only to offline post-mortem debugging
analyses where such rollback-replays can be tolerated.
1.3 Motivation and Contribution
The rollback recovery problem limits OHA from being applied with powerful whole-program anal-
yses for online monitoring on live production software. Rollback and re-execution on server ap-
plications would severely impact their availability, as re-executing the conservative analysis from
beginning would potentially incur replaying years worth of execution since the last reboot. More-
over, rollbacks are infeasible when certain operations like sending a packet over the network cannot
be reverted. This dissertation focuses on the challenge of applying OHA to online dynamic analy-
ses on live production software by eliminating the need for rollback recovery.
Thesis statement: Program analyses leveraging optimistic assumptions with cautious reasoning
can make online dynamic analyses practical on live production software.
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Our Cautiously Optimistic Program Analysis (COPA) technique employs two key principles:
Optimistic Analysis: It infers likely program invariants from dynamic observations, and as-
sumes them in a predicated static analysis to reason more precisely thereby identifying and elid-
ing many wasteful runtime monitors from the optimized dynamic analysis. The resulting system
is fast, and is naturally sound for executions that satisfy the assumed likely invariants.
Cautious Reasoning: In case a likely invariant rarely fails at runtime, it also ensures soundness
by recovering to a conservatively optimized analysis. It identifies the exact conditions when the
optimistic analysis can become unsound, and detects such invariant violations early with eager
invariant checks. It also carefully restricts optimizations to only safe elisions that do not diverge
the analysis metadata state. These two properties together greatly simplify the recovery process
when a likely invariant rarely fails– it avoids rollback upon a likely invariant violation, and enables
forward recovery– the analysis can simply switch to a conservatively optimized one and continue
forward.
The combined benefit of these two principles can enable several useful dynamic analyses ap-
plications for online analyses on live production software at practical overheads.
Organization
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows:
[Chapter 2] discusses the limitations of conservative and prior optimistic hybrid program analyses,
and then presents our Cautiously Optimistic Program Analysis (COPA) technique in detail with its
design objectives, the workflow, and a formal discussion of its soundness guarantee.
Then, we demonstrate COPA’s benefits in three areas–
[Chapter 3]: Dynamic Information Flow Tracking (DIFT) can actively enforce information-flow
policies and detect malicious behaviors, but remains prohibitively expensive. We solve the rollback
recovery problem in optimistic program analysis and apply it to optimize DIFT for live security
monitoring on production software.
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[Chapter 4]: Enforcing temporal memory safety by constructing a correct garbage collector re-
mains difficult for languages like C with weak semantics. We design a sound way of garbage
collection for C by efficiently tracking provenance of pointers at runtime.
[Chapter 5]: Providing strong and intuitive semantics for concurrent programs simplifies program
analyses and debugging tasks, but remains expensive on commodity hardware platforms. We en-
able efficient language-level Sequential Consistency for Java.
[Chapter 6] concludes with a summary of our key contributions and directions for future work.
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CHAPTER 2
Cautiously Optimistic Program Analysis
Traditional hybrid analysis remains prohibitively slow due to the fundamental conservative ap-
proach and imprecision of the underlying sound static analysis. We discuss how the recent ap-
proach of Optimistic Hybrid Analysis (OHA) [1] mitigates some of these limitations by leveraging
likely invariant assumptions, but present a new problem- how to recover soundness of the analy-
sis when an invariant assumption is violated. Then our Cautiously Optimistic Program Analysis
(COPA) approach solves this problem to enable fast dynamic analysis on live software while elim-
inating the need for rollback-replay. This chapter builds the foundational ideas of our work, and
we later elaborate on specific details while discussing its applications.
2.1 Conservative Hybrid Analysis
A naı̈ve dynamic analysis would instrument virtually all instructions with additional monitor op-
erations to maintain dynamic information that may be needed to check certain safety or security
properties. This can result in an order of magnitude or more overhead. However, this overhead
is not fundamental in enforcing most useful properties. Because, in rigorously tested and well-
behaved programs, such properties hold in most correct executions. As a result, much of the
additional work in maintaining analysis state and checking for properties is wasteful. A sound
static analysis can ideally prove for a large number of program instructions that they do not vio-
late the properties in any possible execution and then safely elide the dynamic analysis monitors
associated with them [14].
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Traditional sound static analyses reason about all possible future executions, including many
infeasible ones due to over-approximation. As a result, the analysis state-space can explode, and
indeed many useful static analyses become too slow and do not scale to large complex software.
Moreover, if and when the analyses terminate, the results are imprecise as they cannot effectively
reason the target property for many instructions over the large space of all possible (and many
infeasible) execution states. As we will see in the following chapters, this fundamental imprecision
has limited conservative hybrid analysis from effectively optimizing dynamic analysis, and such
techniques still remain impractical.
2.2 Optimistic Hybrid Analysis
When used for optimizing online dynamic analysis during execution, the static analysis need not
reason over all possible execution states. Instead, it needs to only care about those dynamic execu-
tions that will actually be encountered.
Likely Invariants to Predicate Static Analysis The static analysis can be predicated by making
a set of assumptions called likely invariants. These are program properties that are almost always
true but hard to prove statically. For example– one simple type of likely invariant is unreachable
code. A vast majority of code deals with custom logic to deal with uncommon, exceptional and er-
roneous executions. Furthermore, programs only exhibit a small subset of their possible behaviors
when running under a specific configuration. So, it is reasonable to expect a significant fraction
of code being not reached in most correct executions. So, assuming this invariant would signifi-
cantly reduce the analysis state-space, allowing the static analysis to reason much more precisely
on common-case behavior of the analyzed program. Consequently, the predicated static analysis
can additionally prove the target property for many instructions in all the dynamic executions that
satisfy the assumed likely invariants.
In our work, the likely invariants are collected in a rigorous profiling phase prior to the static
analysis. Observed dynamic behaviors that hold true across all profiled executions are assumed
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in the predicated static analysis. The type of invariants are specific to the target analysis being
optimized and their benefits are also varied. We discuss the specific invariants that we use in the
subsequent chapters.
Traditional static analyses have not leveraged such observed likely invariants for the sake of
soundness. Contrary to intuition, a key distinction of our design is that it does not achieve precision
by sacrificing soundness. Although the predicated static analysis is only sound for executions in
which the assumed likely invariants actually hold, the soundness of the final dynamic execution
can still be guaranteed as long as invariant violations are detected immediately and the execution
is then recovered appropriately.
Optimistic Dynamic Analysis The predicated static analysis effectively elides many dynamic
analysis monitors using its more precise reasoning. The resulting optimized dynamic analysis is
fast, and is guaranteed to be sound for all executions in which the assumed invariants hold. How-
ever if an invariant rarely fails, the dynamic analysis may lose all soundness guarantees. In order to
recover the analysis soundness, the dynamic analysis must then additionally validate the assumed
likely invariants during execution and somehow recover the analysis when an assumed likely in-
variant is violated. Fig. 2.1 illustrates the overall workflow of the analysis framework. Profiled
likely invariants are assumed in the predicated static analysis thereby improving its precision. The
precise static analysis results are used to effectively optimize the dynamic analysis, and invariant
checks are instrumented to validate the assumed likely invariants. In the rare event of an invari-
ant violation, the analysis must be recovered. This is the key challenge that we address in this
dissertation.
Design Objectives
Since our COPA analysis framework is to be applied on live running programs for online dynamic






























Figure 2.1: COPA workflow
O1 Invariants induce strong optimizations: By assuming the invariants, the predicated static anal-
ysis should be able to significantly reduce its state-space, thereby making it more precise. If
invariants do not induce such strong optimizations, they will not effectively reduce the dy-
namic overheads in the common-case.
O2 Invariant checks are inexpensive: To guarantee soundness, the dynamic execution should
additionally check that the assumed invariants hold during an execution. Theses invariant
checks should be simple and inexpensive, so that the benefits of COPA are not outweighed by
the overhead of dynamically verifying the invariants.
O3 Invariants fail only rarely: Invariants should capture dynamic behaviors that are hard to prove
but almost always hold true. This would ensure that executions do not suffer from frequent
invariant violations. Otherwise, recovering from an invariant violation can incur additional
overheads thereby limiting our system’s benefits.
O4 Invariant checks are eager: Invariant failures must be detected before the invariant actually
fails. This would allow the execution to pause at a dynamic state that has not yet been affected
by the likely invariant violation and recover the analysis without losing its guarantees.
O5 Recovery is safe and quick: The recovery process itself must be efficient and carefully con-
structed so as to not violate the analysis correctness. The support needed for recovery in a rare
execution should not entail extensive overhead during common executions. Rollback-replay
based recovery is not practical.
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2.2.1 Problem: Rollback Recovery in OHA
In most dynamic executions, the likely invariants will hold and the optimistic dynamic analysis
will be sound. But when a likely invariant fails dynamically, it may render the predicated static
analysis’ optimizations unsound. The dynamic analysis then requires a mechanism to recover
from an invariant failure. As we use whole-program static analysis, at runtime it is non-trivial to
determine the effect of a current invariant failure on the soundness of an elided monitor in the past.
Prior OHA work [1] addressed this problem by completely replaying the program execution
from the beginning using the conservatively optimized dynamic analysis. Since invariants rarely
fail, this rollback recovery is an acceptable solution for offline retrospective analyses such as de-
bugging and forensic analyses. However, a rollback to the beginning of the program is intolerable
for online analyses on live executions, as it would severely compromise the system’s availability.
Unbounded Rollbacks Bounding rollbacks is generally hard for predicated whole-program static
analyses. Determining the latest point in program execution up to which a rollback is needed is
an unsolved problem. For many analyses, especially backward data-flow analysis, it may not be
possible to bound the rollback window. This unpredictable and unbounded downtime caused by
rollback is problematic for live executions.
Logging Overheads Support for rollback introduces significant additional overheads even for
executions where the likely invariants hold true. This overhead includes the cost of logging for re-
play and periodic check-pointing. Therefore even when the invariants are not violated, eliminating
rollbacks altogether would improve OHA by getting rid of these overheads. The actual cost for
rollback-replay is minor as invariant violations can be made to be rare with sufficient profiling.
We address this problem by enabling forward recovery upon any invariant failure, thus com-
pletely eliminating the need for rollbacks.
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2.3 Cautious Recovery with Safe Elisions
Rollbacks are fundamentally caused by the dependence between the current monitor being elided
and potential future invariant failures. Our idea behind COPA is to distinguish safe elisions, which
do not have such dependencies, from unsafe elisions.
A predicated static analysis in OHA elides a monitor as long as it can prove that it is unnec-
essary to guarantee soundness of dynamic analysis in an execution where the invariants hold. But
an elided monitor is a safe elision only if it can additionally prove that an invariant violation in an
execution would not affect the soundness of any preceding elisions of that monitor.
Rollback-free COPA is realized by restricting its predicated static analysis to only using safe
elisions, and switching to a conservatively optimized analysis on invariant violation.
Statically proving safe elisions is non-trivial for many analyses. To make such an analysis
practical and simple to construct, we further observe that noop monitors are safe elisions. A
noop monitor is one that does not change the analysis metadata state. Eliding noop monitors is
safe for the following reasons: by construction, COPA instruments invariant checks such that they
detect any invariant violation before an execution violates the invariant. Given this, when a noop
monitor is elided before an invariant violation, it is guaranteed that it would be a noop monitor
even in the conservatively optimized analysis, and therefore its elision is sound even when there is
a later invariant violation. Thus, noop monitor elisions are safe elisions.
By restricting to only safe elisions of noop monitors that do not modify the analysis metadata
state, and eagerly checking for invariant violations dynamically, the analysis state is guaranteed
to be exactly the same as in a conservative analysis at the point of invariant violation detection.
Thereafter, the analysis can then be recovered by simply switching to a conservative analysis that
re-instruments the optimistically elided dynamic monitors. We discuss this recovery mechanism
in detail in Chapter 3.
The cautious approach of restricting to only safe elision optimizations and eagerly checking
likely invariants solves the rollback-recovery problem of OHA and enables COPA to be applied
for online analysis on live running software.
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2.4 Soundness Proof
In this section, we formalize the notion of two analyses being state-identical, and then prove the
soundness of rollback-free COPA analysis by showing that it’s state-identical to a conservative
hybrid analysis.
2.4.1 Notations and Notions
An analysis A is a transformation of a program P that only generates additional metadata state
σA and has no side-effect on P ’s program state µP . We define outA to be the outcome of all
dynamically failed check monitors.
We will use the following notations to refer to analyses instances:
UNOP is the unoptimized dynamic analysis that does not elide any monitors.
CONS is the dynamic analysis optimized by conservative static analysis.
OPTII is the dynamic analysis optimized by predicated static analysis assuming the set of invari-
ants I .
COPAI is the rollback-free dynamic analysis optimized by safe elisions using predicated static
analysis assuming the set of invariants I .
σA(l) denotes the metadata state of dynamic analysis A at the program location l. I-FAIL(i)
denotes the point(s) in program execution where the invariant assumption i dynamically fails.
I-CHECK(i) denotes the program location(s) where the invariant validation checks are instru-
mented. A noop monitor is either a track monitor that does not modify σA, or a check monitor
that succeeds.
Definition 1. Analysis equivalence : We say that dynamic analysis A′ is equivalent to dynamic
analysis A, denoted by A′ ≡ A, if for all executions, their analysis outcomes are the same, i.e.,
outA′ = outA.
Definition 2. State-identical : We say that dynamic analysis A′ is state-identical to dynamic anal-
ysis A, denoted by A′ = A, if for all executions, their terminating metadata states σA and σA′ are
identical, i.e., σA′ = σA.
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2.4.2 Axioms
Axiom 1. CONS is sound [14], i.e., CONS ≡ UNOP.
CONS only elides those monitors which can be proven to not change the analysis outcome in
all executions. ∴ CONS ≡ UNOP.
Axiom 2. OPTII is sound when the invariants hold [1], i.e., I |= OPTII ≡ CONS.
In addition to those elided by CONS, OPTII elides only those monitors that can be proven to not
change the analysis outcome in dynamic executions that satisfy I. ∴ I |= outOPTII = outCONS →
I |= OPTII ≡ CONS.
Axiom 3. Invariant violation is detected before a program execution reaches a state that fails an
invariant, i.e., I-CHECK(i) < I-FAIL(i).
By construction, our invariant checks are instrumented such that this property holds.
Axiom 4. COPAI only elides monitors that are noops.
By construction in §2.3, COPAI uses forward predicated static data-flow analysis to elide only
those monitors that it can prove are noops.
2.4.3 Soundness of Rollback-free COPA
We first show that COPAI is state-identical to a sound conservative hybrid analysis for execu-
tions where the invariants hold. Next, we provide a simple program transformation that makes the
COPAI state-identical to CONS even at the point of a dynamic invariant failure. Finally, we show
that the above property allows a forward recovery of COPAI upon an invariant failure, and makes
the whole dynamic analysis sound for all executions.
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Lemma 5. COPAI is state-identical to CONS when the invariants hold, i.e., I |= COPAI =
CONS.
Proof Sketch. By Axiom 4, COPAI elides only those monitors that can be proven to be noops
in dynamic executions that satisfy I. ∴ I |= σCOPAI = σCONS → I |= COPAI = CONS.
Lemma 6. COPAI is sound until an invariant fails, i.e., σCOPAI (I-FAIL(i)) = σCONS(I-FAIL(i)).
Proof Sketch. Consider the analysis COPA{i} with a single invariant i. ¬{i} 6|= COPA{i} =
CONS, i.e., we cannot guarantee soundness for the entire program P if the invariant fails in a
dynamic execution.
Let I-FAIL(i) be the first instance of an invariant failure in the dynamic execution of P . Now,
consider the program P ′ obtained by the following transformation (shown in Fig. 2.2): immediately
after the location of each invariant check, we instrument a HALT instruction conditional on the
invariant i having failed. The elided monitors are shown as equivalent noops.
By Axiom 3, the invariant check preceding I-FAIL(i) will detect the invariant failure before the
program execution reaches a state that fails the invariant. Therefore, the modified program P ′ will
HALT after the failed I-CHECK(i), and before I-FAIL(i). This is equivalent to a program executing
without an invariant failure.
By Lemma 5, COPAI = CONS for P ′. Since, P and P ′ only differ in their termination
behavior and P ′ HALTs at I-FAIL(i), we have that:






I-FAIL(i): · · ·
l2: noop
· · ·
Figure 2.2: Transformed program P ′
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Theorem 7. COPAI with forward-recovery is sound.
Proof Sketch. By the soundness of COPAI on the HALT-transformed program P ′ in Lemma 6,
we have that the metadata state σCOPAI (I-FAIL(i)) at the location of invariant failure is state-
identical to that in CONS. Therefore, the forward-recovery mechanism can simply switch to
CONS on an invariant failure, and that analysis as a whole is analysis-equivalent to CONS. ∴
by Axiom 1, COPAI with forward-recovery is sound.
2.4.4 Insight Summary
Contrasting Axiom 2 and Lemma 5, the key difference is that when I holds, OPTII ≡ CONS but
COPAI = CONS. While the generic OPTII aggressively elides monitors to only preserve analysis-
equivalence, COPAI only elides noop monitors, thus being state-identical to CONS. This allows
the analysis to simply switch to conservative analysis CONS upon invariant violation.
The primary contribution of this dissertation is to solve the rollback recovery problem in an
Optimistic Hybrid Analysis framework, thereby enabling online analyses on live running soft-
ware. We first use COPA to optimize taint analysis for live security monitoring in Chapter 3, then
apply this for a novel application in Chapter 4– constructing a sound Garbage Collector for C.
In Chapter 5, we improve COPA’s recovery mechanism and apply it for efficient language-level
Sequential Consistency for concurrent Java programs.
19
CHAPTER 3
Iodine: Live Information-flow Security Monitoring
Dynamic information-flow tracking (DIFT), also referred to as taint-tracking, is useful for en-
forcing security policies, but rarely used on live running software, as it can slow down a program by
an order of magnitude. Static program analyses used to prove safe execution states and then elide
unnecessary DIFT monitors, yield only marginal benefits due to their need to maintain soundness.
Cautiously Optimistic Program Analysis (COPA) can significantly reduce DIFT overhead and
still be sound– it predicates the static taint analysis to assume likely invariants gathered from pro-
files to dramatically improve precision. The optimized DIFT is sound for executions in which
those invariants hold true, and otherwise recovers to a conservative DIFT. We overcome the main
problem with using COPA to optimize live executions – unbounded rollbacks. We eliminate the
need for any rollback during COPA recovery by limiting to only safe elision optimizations.
Our tool, Iodine, reduces DIFT overhead for enforcing security policies to 9%, which is 4.4×
lower than that with traditional hybrid analysis, while still being able to be run on live systems.
3.1 Live Information-flow Tracking is Challenging
Dynamic information-flow tracking (DIFT) [15] is a powerful method for enforcing a security or
privacy policy. It tags source data (e.g., sensitive user input) as tainted, propagates taints through
data and/or control flow, and checks if tainted data reaches sinks (e.g., network output). DIFT can
help detect a wide range of security attacks [16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22] such as SQL injection,
cross-site scripting, overwrite attacks, etc. It is also used to enforce information-flow policies that
prevent sensitive information from leaking through untrusted channels [23, 24, 25].
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In spite of its established benefits, DIFT is rarely used in practice today, due to its prohibitive
performance overhead [26]. In a naive dynamic taint-tracking, every instruction has to be moni-
tored to propagate taints. There have been several attempts to reduce this cost, e.g. by reducing
tainted sources [27], by coarsening the taint granularity [18], and by decoupling program execution
to perform a symbolic taint analysis [28, 29]. These approaches can compromise accuracy, intro-
duce parallelization and synchronization costs, and still remain prohibitive for production use [30].
Optimistic Hybrid Analysis [1] (OHA) For rigorously tested production software, execution
paths that violate an information-flow policy are almost certainly either rare or impossible. For
such programs, pure dynamic taint analyses fundamentally do more work than necessary. A static
taint analysis can identify instructions which cannot propagate taints to a sink [14], and DIFT
monitors for such instructions can be elided. By assuming program properties that are almost
always true but hard to prove statically, OHA can dramatically improve the precision and scalability
of static taint analysis, thereby reducing DIFT overhead.
A fundamental problem with OHA is that, if the assumed likely invariants fail during an ex-
ecution, then the soundness of dynamic analysis for that execution is compromised. To ensure
soundness, prior OHA work [1] checked the likely invariants at runtime, and when they fail, the
program execution is replayed from the beginning with a conservatively optimized dynamic anal-
ysis. This unbounded rollback-recovery is acceptable only for retrospective offline analyses, and
not feasible for online security analysis of live executions.
We solve this problem by completely eliminating the need for rollbacks and enable forward
recovery on a likely invariant failure. Rollbacks in OHA are caused by the runtime dependence
between the current monitor being elided, and any potential future invariant violations that may
affect the soundness of that elision. In order to construct rollback-free COPA, we must break this
dependence. In other words, any monitor elided during a program execution, before an invariant
failure, has to be proven to be unnecessary to ensure soundness of the dynamic analysis for the
entire execution. We refer to eliding monitors satisfying this property as safe elisions.
21
Safe Elisions for rollback-free COPA: Our key idea is to constrain predicated static analysis,
such that it removes a runtime monitor only if it can prove that it is a safe elision. Given this, when
a likely invariant fails at runtime, it is sufficient to simply switch to a conservatively optimized
analysis, and continue forward with the execution.
To restrict COPA to safe elisions, we further observe that many analyses, particularly bug find-
ing and security analyses such as DIFT, often have monitors that do not modify any analysis’
metadata state when executed. We call such monitors noop monitors. By constructing a predi-
cated static analysis that identifies and elides only noop monitors, we guarantee that any elision
done by our predicated static analysis will not have any effect on dynamic analysis state until an
invariant failure. Consequently, the soundness of these elisions cannot depend on any potential fu-
ture invariant violations, because eliding a noop has the same effect as executing a noop, making
the noop elisions safe, and enabling forward recovery.
This enables efficient and sound DIFT running on live executions without requiring rollbacks.
Our work makes the following contributions:
• We construct a novel optimistic hybrid analysis technique to realize low-overhead DIFT for live
executions.
• We solve an important unresolved problem with OHA, which prevents its use for live analysis:
need for unbounded roll-back when a likely invariant fails. We prove that restricting predicated
static analysis to eliding only noop monitors guarantees meta-data equivalence between opti-
mistic and conservative hybrid analyses. This property in turn enables forward recovery when
an invariant fails.
• We improve the profiling methodology for OHA based on regression and beta-testing. We show
that likely invariants profiled using regression test suites are effective in obtaining majority of
the performance benefits.
• Our approach reduces the overhead of DIFT to 9%, which is 4.4× lower than that with conser-
vative hybrid analysis, and 68× lower than that with pure dynamic analysis.
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3.2 Information Flow Analyses
Information-flow analysis, also called Taint Analysis [15] computes how the information in a given
value of a program state is influenced by other relevant values. The analysis requires specifying a
taint policy consisting of three components–
Sources identify program locations where a specific taint marking is attached with a value. Typical
sources include program arguments and external input interfaces like console / file / network input.
Sinks assert specified checks on the taint state of certain values at a given program location. These
checks typically assert the presence or absence of certain taints on values, typically before the
program emits them via an output interface, e.g. sending a network packet.
Propagation policy determines how taints for new values are computed. Taints typically propagate
explicitly via data-flow– when a tainted value is used in a computation, the resultant should also
carry the source’s taint(s). Taints can also propagate implicitly, e.g. via control-dependence– when
values are computed conditional on a tainted value, the resultant values should carry the taint(s) of
the condition variable. The propagation policy also specifies how to accumulate taint sets, typically
using union or re-assignment.
Additionally, some taint analyses can specify certain untaint operations that clear or sanitize a
tainted value, e.g. an encryption function may untaint the taint of its plaintext argument.
1 void main (...) {
2 int a, b, c;
3 scanf("%d", &a);
4 t(a) ← {secret} source
5 if (a < 0) b = -1;
6 t(b) ← t(a) = {secret} implicit track
7 c = a * b;
8 t(c) ← t(a) ∪ t(b) = {secret} track
9 assert(secret /∈ t(c)); check
10 send(..., c);
11 }
Figure 3.1: Example of taint analysis
A dynamic taint analysis instruments moni-
tor operations for instructions in the target pro-
gram. Track monitors propagate taints from the
source operands to the resultant of an instruc-
tion, as per the specified propagation function.
Check monitors assert predicates on the taint
state at sinks.
Fig. 3.1 shows an example program in-
strumented with taint analysis monitors (high-
lighted). In line line 3, a is read from user in-
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put, so this is treated as a taint source and attached with a secret taint. In line line 5, b’s value
is determined by whether a is negative or not, so taint propagates implicitly. In line line 7, c is
computed from a and b, so taint propagates explicitly and is computed as the union of taints of
source operands. Finally in line line 10, c’s taint is checked before emitting it on the network.
Uses: Taint analysis can be tailored to a specific application by adjusting its taint policy. For
example, information leakage is an important concern in database and web-service applications,
where taint analysis is used to track the flow of sensitive information through program execution
and prevent its leakage through unsecured channels. Taint analysis [31] is widely used in secu-
rity analyses of programs to detect and prevent against overwrite attacks [16, 17, 18], command
injection attacks [19, 20], cross site scripting attacks in web applications [21, 22], and to enforce
information flow policies [24]. It has also been applied in semantic analysis of programs for pro-
gram understanding [32], testing and debugging [33, 34].
3.3 Cautiously Optimistic Program Analysis for Fast DIFT
First, we illustrate the limitations of conservative hybrid analysis and motivate OHA [1] with an
example of DIFT monitoring. Then we introduce the design of Iodine, an instance of our COPA
analysis that significantly reduces DIFT overhead and supports live executions by eliminating the
need for rollback-replay.
Fig. 3.2(a) illustrates naive DIFT. Assume that s is a taint source, and printf is a sink. Taint
propagates from s to y (line 2), and then it may or may not propagate to z (line 4) depending on
the branch outcome in line 3. If the taint does propagate to z, it can reach out (line 5), and then
reach the sink (line 6), causing an assertion failure.
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3.3.1 Conservative Hybrid Taint Analysis
As shown in Fig. 3.2(a), a pure DIFT instruments virtually all instructions to propagate taints. This
can result in an order of magnitude or more overhead. However, this overhead is not fundamental
to enforcing a taint analysis. Because, in a rigorously tested program, information-flow leaks are
rare. As a result, many of the DIFT monitors are either not propagating taints, or even if they do,
they do no reach any sink. A sound static data-flow analysis can prove these properties and remove
these dynamic monitors [14].
A static analysis constructs a data-flow model of the program, using the same taint policy as
the dynamic taint analysis. From this static model, the hybrid analysis will typically optimize its
dynamic taint monitors in two ways:
Forward Taint Analysis reasons from taint sources forward in the program, determining if the
source operands of an instruction may be tainted or not. If none of the source operands may
be tainted for an instruction, then the static analysis can remove its monitor. For example, in
Fig. 3.2(b), the analysis can reason that neither source operands in the instruction x = c + 3 are
tainted, and therefore x will not be tainted, allowing its monitor to be elided.
main (…) {
x = c + 3;
y = s;
if (p < 0){





x = c + 3;
y = s;
if (p < 0){




t (z) =  t (c) | t (y);
main (…) {
1 x = c + 3;
2 y = s;
3 if (p < 0){
4 z = c * y;
}
5 out = z;
6 printf(z); }
t (x) =  t (c);
t (y) =  t (s);
t (z) =  t (c) | t (y);
assert(!t (z));
source: s sink: printf()
main (…) {
x = c + 3;
y = s;
if (p < 0){




t (y) =  t (s);
t (z) =  t (c) | t (y);
inv_check( );
t (y) =  t (s);
t (z) =  t (c) | t (y);
inv_check( );







(b) Conservative hybrid analysis(a) Full dynamic analysis (c) Optimistic hybrid analysis (d) Rollback-free OHA
Figure 3.2: DIFT optimizations. Green dot indicates safe noop elisions, and ! indicates unsafe
elision.
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Backward Taint Analysis reasons whether a destination operand of an instruction may reach
a sink. If not, the monitor for that instruction is elided, even if it can be tainted. In Fig. 3.2(b),
the conservative static analysis cannot leverage this optimization to elide any monitors, because it
cannot prove this property for any of the instructions considering all possible executions.
3.3.2 Optimistic Hybrid Taint Analysis
As we discussed in Chapter 2, traditional sound static analysis is limited by its sound considera-
tion of all possible execution states. But, static analyses used for optimizing a dynamic analysis
should ideally consider only those states that will be realized in the analyzed dynamic executions.
Targeting the expected executions can significantly improve the precision and scalability of static
analysis, thereby optimizing a dynamic analysis much effectively than its conservative counterpart.
Fig. 3.2(c) illustrates this untapped opportunity. If all expected executions of this program only
have non-negative values for the variable p, the code region R is never executed. A sound static
analysis cannot assume this behavior, because there are legal executions where p < 0. However,
by constraining the static analysis to expected dynamic executions, Iodine can reason that the
variable z does not get tainted due to y in line 4, and in turn proves that out in line 5 cannot
be tainted. Therefore, it elides track monitor for line 5, and check monitor for the sink in line 6.
Furthermore, backward data-flow analysis determines that taint of y in line 2 can never reach any
sink, and elides its monitor. None of these three monitors could be elided using conservative static
analysis (Fig. 3.2(b)).
Iodine’s work-flow is illustrated in Fig. 3.3. First, a profiler observes representative executions
to gather a set of likely invariants – dynamic execution properties that almost always hold, but are
hard to prove statically, e.g. likely unreachable code, likely callee sets, and likely unrealized call
contexts [1]. Second, these likely invariants are used to constrain the state-space resulting in a
predicated static taint analysis. This is much more precise and scalable than a conservative sound
static taint analysis, and enables Iodine to aggressively elide DIFT monitors. The program is then



























Figure 3.3: Workflow of optimistic hybrid taint analysis
3.3.3 Safe Elisions of noop Monitors
In §2.2.1, we saw how invariant violations in a general OHA analysis may require a rollback to
recover the analysis. For example, in Fig. 3.2 (c), if the likely unreachable code invariant (R) is
violated in line 3, it would render the past elision of monitor for line 2 to be unsound since the taint
metadata state would diverge.
We then discussed in §2.3, how to overcome this problem by identifying noop monitors and
performing safe elisions. A noop track monitor is one that does not change the taint analysis
metadata state. A noop check monitor is one that always succeeds the taint check. For example,
in Fig. 3.2(c), monitors for lines 5 and 6 are noop monitors, if we assume R is unreachable.
Monitor for line 2, however, is not a noop monitor, as its execution can modify the taint set even
if invariants hold true.
Elisions in Predicated Forward Analysis are Safe
In §3.3.1, we discussed forward and backward static taint analysis. Forward static data-flow taint
analysis elides a monitor for an instruction by proving that its source operands must not be tainted.
The taint for the destination operand of such an instruction remains unchanged. Thus, all the mon-
itors elided by predicated forward taint analysis are noop monitors, and therefore safe elisions.
Fig. 3.2(d) shows that in rollback-free COPA, the elision of the monitors for lines 5 and 6
induced by forward taint analysis, are both noop safe elisions.
27
Elisions in Predicated Backward Analysis may not be Safe
Monitors elided by a predicated backward taint analysis are not guaranteed to be safe elisions. A
backward taint analysis seeks to prove that an instruction’s destination taint does not reach a sink,
and if so it elides its monitor. Monitors elided by this analysis are not guaranteed to be noops.
For example, the monitor for line 2 in Fig. 3.2(d) is not a noop, because it changes the taint of y.
But a predicated backward analysis can elide it by assuming R is unreachable. However, during
an execution, if that invariant fails, recovery must somehow produce the correct taint state of y,
before proceeding forward. Given that we use a whole-program analysis, it is unclear how far the
execution needs to be rolled-back and re-executed.
A more fundamental reason why elisions in backward-analysis may not be safe is their depen-
dence on invariants holding true in the future. It may still be possible to construct safe elisions
through sophisticated optimizations. For example, if we can somehow determine the set of all
monitors elided due to a particular invariant (R is unreachable), then hoisting the invariant check
before those elisions can make them safe elisions. Such a transformation is non-trivial for a pred-
icated whole program analysis. Fortunately, we found the predicated forward taint analysis to be
quite effective by itself. Also, backward analysis is not useful for certain information-flow policies
such as one that monitors taints from sources to all possible locations in a program.
3.3.4 Rollback-Free Cautiously Optimistic Taint Analysis
Iodine uses a predicated forward taint analysis along with a conservative backward taint analysis.
Optimized dynamic analysis (fast-path) is executed until an invariant fails. As the analysis only
elides noop monitors, it tracks exactly the same metadata as a conservative analysis at all program
points. Fig. 3.4 shows the forward recovery mechanism– a conditional branch is instrumented for
every invariant check, which switches the control to a conservative analysis (slow-path) when any
check fails. The execution then continues forward in the slow-path. This switch is safe due to
two reasons: (1) the two paths only differ in analysis logic and maintain the same program state,





Figure 3.4: COPA forward recovery switching mechanism: Each function implements fast-path
and slow-path in separate control flow domains, and execution switches from fast-path to slow-
path upon detecting an invariant violation.
ensure a safe switch. At the time of the switch, the return addresses on the stack would be pointing
to fast-path return sites. We address this problem by checking every return site, and transferring
control to either the fast or slow path based on the current mode of execution.
Iodine conservatively disables all optimistic optimizations upon an invariant violation. Given
adequate profiles for a rigorously tested production software, invariant failures are very rare. If
there is indeed an invariant failure in production, the program can be re-optimized offline after
removing the offending invariant from the likely-invariant set. Thus, in the steady-state, invariant
violations would be extremely rare. Alternatively, only the optimizations induced by the violated
invariant could be selectively disabled. Also, since it is common for live systems to be periodically
restarted [35], the execution can switch back to the fast-path on a restart.
3.4 Iodine Implementation
We present an overview of the notable features of our tool here, and the details of its implementa-
tion are presented in [36, §5].
The Iodine tool consists of a profiler, a profile-driven predicated static analysis phase, and
the optimized dynamic analysis instrumenter. These are implemented in the LLVM 3.9 compiler
infrastructure [37], and we run our analysis tool after all other compiler optimization passes. Io-
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dine supports programs written in the C language, tracks taint flows through external libraries via
static linkage. The final optimized DIFT is added using LLVM’s Data Flow Sanitizer[38] as our
instrumentation backend.
Specifying Information-Flow Policies By default, Iodine uses a configurable taint policy that
treats all types of external inputs to the program as potential taint sources (e.g. terminal, file,
socket input functions, and command-line arguments) and asserts that the appropriate arguments
to standard output interfaces (e.g. terminal, file and socket outputs) should not be tainted.
Useful taint policies can be specified to identify custom taint sources, sink locations, and un-
taint functions via a flexible interface of source-level annotations. This adapts the tool to evaluate
security-critical applications with realistic information flow policies– e.g. the Postfix mail server
with policies to check for email integrity and privacy, and the Nginx web server with detection
against malicious overwrite attacks.
Static Taint and Pointer Analysis Static taint analysis computes how the taints of data prop-
agate through the program under a given selection of taint sources, sinks, and propagation poli-
cies. The static taint analysis uses a whole-program context-sensitive flow-sensitive data-flow
may-analysis [16] to constructs a inter-procedural definition-use graph (DUG) [39]. To track taint
flows via indirect memory operations to aliased locations, we compute the points-to set of each
pointer location and then use this information to add taint-flow edges to the DUG from pointer
definition to its aliasing uses.
Once the DUG is constructed, the analysis can induce two optimizations.
Forward optimizations: Taints are propagated through the whole-program DUG using for-
ward data-flow until a transitive closure is reached. Since our dataflow analysis is a may analysis,
the absence of taint flow is a sound must not assertion. Therefore, any instruction without tainted
source operands can elide dynamic monitors for taint tracking.
Backward optimizations: Taint flows that do not eventually reach a sink can be pruned out
using a backward co-reachability analysis on the DUG. These optimizations are only enabled in
the conservative static analysis.
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Predicated Static Taint Analysis To improve the precision of the static taint analysis, Iodine
profiles three types of likely invariants – likely unreachable code, likely callee set, and likely un-
realized call contexts [1]. By assuming these likely invariants, the DUG constructed for static
analysis is much smaller, thereby improving scalability and accuracy of our optimistic pointer and
taint analyses. Iodine implements predicated versions of pointer analysis and forward data-flow
analysis, and the backward data-flow analysis is not predicated as required in §2.3.
Optimistic Hybrid Taint Analysis The predicated static taint analysis identifies the set of in-
structions that need to be monitored. DIFT monitors for only these instructions are then instrument
using LLVM DFSan [38], effectively eliding the remaining noop monitors.
Metadata tracking monitors track taints for each program variable and memory locations at the
byte-granularity in separate taint data structures in a shadow memory, and we only consider explicit
taint flows [26]. Iodine can track a single logical taint as well as multiple taint tags per location.
Invariant checks for all used invariants are added to detect if an invariant is violated dynamically.
3.5 Evaluation
We compare the performance of our approach with conservative hybrid and state-of-the-art full
dynamic taint tracking [38]. Dynamic taint tracking incurs 7× overhead over native execution, and
hybrid analysis-optimized taint tracking incurs 37% overhead. Our optimized taint tracking tool
brings down the overhead of dynamic taint tracking to 9%. Our evaluation shows that Iodine:
• Enables production use of taint tracking by dramatically reducing the overhead of taint tracking
compared to conservative hybrid analysis and pure dynamic analysis.
• Efficiently implements real-world information-flow policies for security-critical applications.
• Requires reasonable profiling efforts. We show regression tests are adequate to get majority of
the performance benefits.
• Improves the precision and scalability of static taint analysis.
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Experimental Setup
We evaluate Iodine over several security-sensitive real-world applications, including web servers,
mail server, database server, and utility programs. Our benchmarks are listed in Table 3.1.
We test Iodine in a manner that parallels how we envision it will be used in practice. We first
profile a set of profiling executions to gather likely invariants. Then, we use these profiled invari-
ants in a predicated static analysis to construct our final optimized dynamic taint analysis for a
given information-flow policy. We generate a set of 500 diverse profile inputs by sweeping the
programs’ parameter space (e.g., data size, #clients, #requests, compression factor, etc.; excluding
standardized parameters, e.g., TCP/SMTP port). We randomly partition these inputs into two dis-
joint sets- a profile set consisting 400 executions, and a performance test set of 100 executions. We
note that in an actual production environment the profiling overhead of Iodine would be amortized
over all future executions of the program, not just the 100 we test.
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Figure 3.5: Result: Dynamic information-flow tracking overheads
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3.5.1 IFT Security Policies
We demonstrate the effectiveness of Iodine using real taint policies by applying it to a set of com-
monly used applications with realistic taint policies adapted from Dytan [26] and Google desktop’s
privacy policy [40]. The policies we study are:
Email integrity and privacy: We add security checks to the Postfix mail server, following
the policies outlined in [27, 40]. These policies ensure: receiver addresses are entirely determined
by user input and message dates are only determined by the time system call (email integrity),
and message bodies are passed through sanitizing functions that perform encryption, and check for
unmatched HTML tags or scripting tags (privacy + security).
Overwrite attacks on web server: We enforce a taint policy on the Nginx web server that
taints all network inputs, and asserts that tainted values are not used as function pointers, return
addresses, or format strings. This policy detects a malicious overwrite attack [26].
Results: Iodine shows a 4.4× reduction in runtime overhead for these realistic case studies,
incurring only 7% to 12% overhead, compared to 27% to 52% obtained with conservative hybrid
analysis. These results are shown in Fig. 3.5, as well as those of a naive dynamic IFT analysis. With
these significant runtime improvements Iodine enables taint tracking in many production systems
where performance concerns often preclude security.
3.5.2 Generic Information-Flow Policies
We further test Iodine’s effectiveness in reducing taint overhead over additional benchmarks by
using two synthetic taint policies to evaluate the effectiveness of our framework in a forward-only
analysis versus a forward-backward analysis.
Some-to-some: Propagates taints from a randomly sampled fraction of the taint sources to the
set of all sink instructions. This uses both forward and backward static taint analyses.
Some-to-all: Treats all instructions as potential sinks and propagates taints from the sampled
taint sources. Only forward static taint optimizations are used to optimize this analysis.
Some-to-all taint policies are useful in many non-security contexts such as database provenance
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and lineage queries, information flow in debugging and software testing. This optimization also
isolates the forward optimizations of our hybrid IFT framework, showing directly how effective
predicated static analysis is at optimizing taint checks versus a sound static analysis. We treat all
input interfaces from console/file/network as potential taint sources and elect to randomly sample
1
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of them for these taint policies. All output interfaces to console/file/network are taint sinks.
Results: When applied to some-to-some taint tracking (Fig. 3.6a), Iodine reduces the dynamic
overhead of conservative hybrid taint analysis by 2.8×, bringing the overhead of taint tracking
from 51% with conservative hybrid analysis down to 18% over native unmonitored execution.
Iodine sees similar reductions in some-to-all tracking overhead (Fig. 3.6b), reducing overhead of
taint tracking to 24%, versus 92% for conservative hybrid analysis, and 276% for a pure dynamic
analysis. Once again, Iodine brings overheads down significantly, demonstrating its capability to
enable taint-tracking on production systems.
SPEC benchmarks: To further evaluate Iodine’s performance on compute-intensive programs,
we run it with the same randomized some-to-some analysis setup on the SPECint benchmarks that
are written in C with reference inputs. The results of these experiments are shown in Fig. 3.7. The
SPECint benchmarks are tuned to be CPU bound, and therefore exhibit higher DIFT overheads
compared to our other case studies. Iodine improves the dynamic overhead of taint analysis by
4.5×, bringing the overhead of taint tracking over unmonitored execution from 183% with conser-
vative hybrid analysis down to 41%.
Comparison to ideal analysis: We construct an optimal analysis that only monitors instruc-
tions that are dynamically found to propagate taint, the very minimum set of instructions a some-
to-all analysis could gather. We measure the average dynamic overhead of this ideal some-to-all
taint analysis to be 13%. This shows that at 24% overhead, Iodine is 86% closer to optimal than
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Full Dynamic Conservative Hybrid Iodine
Figure 3.7: Result: Taint tracking performance on SPECint C benchmarks
3.5.3 Memory Overheads
Iodine maintains the exact metadata state as a conservative analysis. Therefore, the memory space
overhead of metadata tracking remains unchanged. Iodine does increase code-size by generating
two versions of the code: the fast-path and slow-path. However, as only one version of the code is
executed at a time, this has little impact on the caching behavior or performance of the program.
On average, the code footprint of a program instrumented by Iodine increases by 2.1×, compared
to 1.4× with conservative hybrid taint analysis, and 1.8× with pure dynamic taint analysis.
3.5.4 Iodine’s Framework Overheads
Invariant Check Cost: Fig. 3.6 also isolates the invariant checking costs. Invariant checks are
only required in Iodine’s optimistic analysis framework and are absent from the full dynamic and
conservative hybrid analysis. Overall we observe that invariant checks have nearly no effect on
end runtime, incurring only 2% of overall execution time.
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Invariant Violations and Switching Overhead: Overall Iodine observes largely inconsequen-
tial rates of invariant violations, with only sendmail, redis and vim violating an invariant
during some-to-all analysis in 3, 2, and 5 (out of 100) executions respectively. This indicates
that our profiling methodology captures the common-case dynamic execution behavior effectively,
significantly optimizing the dynamic analysis. The amortized overhead of the slow path analysis
resulting from these violations is less than 0.5%. Note that the slow-path overhead can be no worse
than that of conservative hybrid analysis.
We also find that the runtime overhead of the switching mechanism at function call return sites
is negligible.
3.5.5 Precise and Scalable Static Analysis
Fig. 3.8 shows how assuming different types of invariants successively reduces the number of





































































































































































































Conservative +Unreachable Codes +Callee Sets +Call Contexts
Figure 3.8: Result: Improved static taint analysis precision by assuming different invariants– Con-
servative some-to-some analysis uses a context-insensitive pointer-analysis, while the predicated analysis
can scalably apply a context-sensitive pointer analysis.
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Table 3.1: Static analysis time breakups for Iodine’s some-to-some taint analysis
Benchmark Conservative Static Analysis Predicated Static Analysis
Points-to Taint Total Profiling Points-to† Taint Total
qmqp-sink 8s 4m 28s 4m 36s 1m 19s 12s 36s 2m 07s
qmqp-source 7s 14m 18s 14m 25s 1m 45s 5s 1m 12s 3m 02s
smtp-sink 9s 6m 12s 6m 21s 2m 00s 16s 44s 3m 39s
smtp-source 11s 11m 44s 11m 55s 2m 19s 9s 1m 08s 3m 35s
sendmail 15s 16m 53s 17m 08s 2m 02s 13s 1m 37s 4m 32s
nginx 19s 20m 04s 20m 24s 1m 12s 12s 1m 30s 2m 54s
thttpd 18s 17m 54s 18m 12s 59s 16s 1m 14s 2m 29s
redis 1m 18s 19m 43s 21m 01s 2m 01s 10s 1m 25s 3m 35s
vim 32s 61m 22s 61m 54s 5m 12s 88s 2m 54s 9m 35s
gzip 8s 8m 49s 8m 58s 7m 03s 17s 1m 22s 8m 42s
†Our optimistic framework enables us to scalably apply more accurate context-sensitive points-to analysis during the
predicated static analysis
sis requires instrumenting 63% instructions on average, our predicated static taint analysis nearly
halves this value at 37%, providing the foundation for Iodine’s performance results. This translates
to eliding 54%(nginx)−86%(vim) of the dynamic taint checks from a conservatively optimized
analysis.
Table 3.1 summarizes the breakdown of static analysis times for both the conservative static
and our predicated static versions. Applying the invariant assumptions to constrain the static anal-
ysis search space enables us to scalably apply a context-sensitive pointer analysis. This further
improves the precision of our predicated static analysis. We see that a reasonable effort spent in
profiling significantly reduces the overall static taint analysis time. In fact, the total static analysis
time including the profiling time is lower than that of conservative static analysis for all our test
programs. This makes Iodine suitable for deployment in production where the applications are
constantly evolving thereby requiring re-analyzing them statically for hybrid analysis.
3.5.6 Profiling During Regression Testing Is Effective
An important concern with profile-based optimizations is the time and effort spent in profiling as
well as the system’s sensitivity to the profile set. We observe that software regression tests seek to
maximize code and path coverage, and are therefore good candidates for conservative profiling.
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We evaluate this approach by profiling three programs- nginx, redis on their packaged
regression test suites, and vim on open-source test suites [41, 42]. The results in Fig. 3.9 show that
profiling on regression test suites alone is very effective. It reduces the runtime overhead to 31%
compared to 55% with conservative hybrid analysis. We however observe invariants being violated
dynamically after this profiling, and so recommend further profiling on beta tests. Profiling on the
beta tests (shaded right halves) reduces the invariant violation rate significantly and brings down
the analysis overhead to 23%.
Thus, we leverage the existing software testing suites to perform Iodine’s initial profiling, and
recommend reasonable beta testing for learning invariants to optimize Iodine. Moreover, Iodine is
resilient to weak profiling. Our analysis needs no guarantees that all states are profiled; and even if
the invariants fail dynamically, the constructed optimized analysis is still sound. Failing invariants
can be learned over time and the optimized analysis can be adaptively re-constructed to exclude
those without requiring analysis rollbacks. Iodine requires test suites with reasonable coverage for
profiling, and is moreover resilient to profiling inaccuracies.
3.5.7 Sensitivity to Fraction of Tainted Data
Hybrid analyses (both traditional and Iodine) elide instrumentation that cannot propagate taint. As
a growing set of inputs carry taints, the taints spread faster to nearly the program’s entire data space.
If nearly all data is tainted, there is no optimization opportunity and Iodine fails to effectively elide
taint checks. To investigate this behavior, in Fig. 3.10, we look at how Iodine’s normalized runtime
varies with increasing the taint sampling fraction in our some-to-all taint analysis in §3.5.2. We
statically identify all viable taint sources (input interfaces from console/file/network) and randomly
sample the stipulated fraction of them to be active. Since selected sources might vary in their
dynamic execution frequencies, we run on 100 different samples for a given sampling fraction
(except for 100%).
As expected, we observe that Iodine’s performance degrades in general when dealing with
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Regression Tests Beta Tests
(c) vim
Figure 3.9: Result: Profiling invariants while software testing– Profiling is done in two phases- first on
regression test suites (left unshaded), and then on beta tests (right shaded). The solid marked lines plot anal-
ysis overheads with Iodine using invariants gathered at different stages of profiling. The numbers labeled
on the plot indicate the number of dynamic invariant violations. The horizontal solid lines representing con-
servative hybrid analysis are an upper bound to Iodine’s overheads. The dashed lines against the secondary




































% Sampled taint sources
qmqp-sink qmqp-source smtp-sink smtp-source nginx
thttpd gzip sendmail redis vim
14% 19% 23%
Figure 3.10: Result: Iodine’s sensitivity to fraction of tainted data – performance benefits reduce
with larger fractions of the program’s data space being tainted. Fraction of taints observed for
realistic taint policies (§3.5.1) are annotated.
of tainted input. This behavior is fundamental to hybrid analysis, and is no worse in Iodine than
in a conservative hybrid analysis. Iodine is effective when the target program and the taint policy
induce a low fraction of tainted data. We observe that this property indeed holds for the IFT
security policies studied in §3.5.1; the static fraction of active taint sources therein are between
14-23% (circled in Fig. 3.10).
3.6 Related Work
Iodine builds on the prior optimistic hybrid analysis work [1] in two major ways- (1) it constructs
a rollback-free OHA by limiting to only safe elision optimizations thereby solving the recovery
problem in OHA, and (2) applies this novel technique to realize a low overhead DIFT solution for




There has been significant work on dynamic taint tracking systems [26, 43, 23]. Past work has
developed many optimized dynamic techniques, such as creating highly specific information-flow
policies [25, 20, 19], reducing its scope to only apply to related processes [44], optimizing low-
level taint operations [45], writing minimal emulators targeted for taint tracking [30], or even
providing custom hardware support [24, 46, 47, 48]. All of these optimizations operate purely on
the dynamic state of the program, attempting to make existing set of taint operations faster. Iodine
elides taint operations through static analysis, reducing the set of instructions monitored, making
its optimization complementary to these prior approaches.
Taint tracking has also been parallelized either by partitioning the execution into epochs to per-
form local analysis and then aggregating results [49, 50], or by decoupling taint analysis from the
program execution [51, 28, 29, 52], wherein the dynamic instrumentation only performs lightweight
logging followed by an offline analysis. These efforts reduce latency of taint tracking through
parallelization, but not overall work, like Iodine does. They too are complimentary to Iodine’s
optimizations.
Static Analysis
Several systems have attempted to solve taint tracking using language features to enforce a taint
policy at compile-time, sometimes with limited dynamic checks [53, 54]. These systems achieve
low runtime overhead, but place the burden on the programmer to specify and guarantee taint
policy using an unfamiliar restrictive language. Iodine optimizes dynamic analysis, and does not
require source code changes, other than trivial annotations specifying taint sources, sinks, and
untaint functions.
Hybrid Analysis
Hybrid analysis has been explored in the past [55] for accelerating DIFT. Moore et al. provide the
soundness conditions for static analysis to determine when it is safe to stop tracking certain vari-
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ables dynamically [14]. In addition to removing unnecessary monitors using static analysis, Chang
et al. statically transform untrusted programs into policy-enforcing programs to further reduce the
amount of data to be tracked dynamically [5]. Jee et al. statically separate the taint tracking logic
from the program logic and then optimize it using abstract taint flow algebra [28]. Hybrid sys-
tems have also coalesced taint checks through static analysis [18, 56]. While these traditional
hybrid analyses use sound static analysis to conservatively reduce dynamic overheads, Iodine fur-
ther improves runtime overheads with use of unsound, predicated static analysis. Iodine’s use of
optimistic hybrid analysis with forward recovery could likely be combined with these systems for
further taint optimizations.
Blended analysis [8] uses dynamic information to improve the accuracy of a best-effort static
taint checking tool for JavaScript applications [11]. While they utilize dynamic information to
make static analysis tractable for corner-case dynamic language features (e.g., eval), our likely
invariants captures common program behaviors to improve whole-program static analysis. More-
over, their end goal is just to improve static analysis, and stop short of optimizing dynamic analysis.
They also do not provide soundness or completeness guarantees for any results produced. Iodine
produces sound and complete dynamic analysis for live executions.
Profile-guided Compiler Optimizations
Profile-guided optimizations [57, 58] learn invariants through profiling and use them for local
optimizations. In particular, work on JIT optimizing compilers such as those that speculatively
inline functions [59], or speculatively convert indirect function calls to direct function calls [60],
speculatively optimize execution, as done in Iodine. Our work differs in two key ways. First,
while compiler optimizations focus on optimizing program logic, Iodine aims at eliding unnec-
essary runtime DIFT monitors. A more fundamental difference is that Iodine uses invariants to
improve precision and scalability of whole-program static analysis. In contrast, profile-guided op-
timizations do not typically consider whole-program static analysis, and therefore the methods for
checking invariants and recovery are simpler and cheaper than optimistic hybrid analysis.
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Summary
Iodine presents a novel Cautiously Optimistic Program Analysis (COPA) technique to optimize
DIFT. We solve a key challenge in applying COPA to online analyses on live executions – roll-
back recovery. We eliminated the need for rollbacks by restricting our predicated static analysis
optimizations to noop safe elisions. Iodine significantly improves the precision of static data-flow




PROV-GC: Provenance-based Sound Garbage Collection for C
Garbage collection (GC) support for unmanaged languages can reduce programming burden
in reasoning about liveness of dynamic objects. It also avoids temporal memory safety violations
and memory leaks. Sound GC for weakly-typed languages such as C/C++, however, remains
an unsolved problem. Current value-based GC solutions examine values of memory locations
to discover the pointers, and the objects they point to. The approach is inherently unsound in
the presence of arbitrary type casts and pointer manipulations, which are legal in C/C++. Such
language features are regularly used, especially in low-level systems code.
In this paper, we propose Dynamic Pointer Provenance Tracking to realize sound GC. We ob-
serve that pointers cannot be created out-of-thin-air, and they must have provenance to at least
one valid allocation. Therefore, by tracking pointer provenance from the source (e.g., malloc)
through both explicit data-flow and implicit control-flow, our GC has sound and precise informa-
tion to compute the set of all reachable objects at any program state. We discuss several static anal-
ysis optimizations, that can be employed during compilation aided with profiling, to significantly
reduce the overhead of dynamic provenance tracking from nearly 8× to 16% for well-behaved
programs that adhere to the C standards. Pointer provenance based sound GC invocation is also
13% faster and reclaims 6% more memory on average, compared to an unsound value-based GC.
4.1 Enforcing Memory Safety is Challenging
Unmanaged languages such as C/C++ are the languages of choice for a vast set of large, com-
plex, ubiquitous, and critical software bases, such as- Linux, OpenSSL, Nginx, Redis, and these
languages continue to be popular among many developers. Unmanaged languages require pro-
grammers to explicitly allocate and free memory space. This requirement not only increases pro-
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gramming burden, but is also a source of common classes of bugs: use-after-free and memory
leaks. Use-after-free bugs are not just a reliability issue, but a significant source of security vul-
nerabilities in modern systems [61], as they compromise temporal memory safety [6]. In spite
of significant advancements, prior solutions for temporal memory safety incur prohibitive perfor-
mance overheads (∼ 60% [6, 7, 62]). Memory leaks also compromise system reliability and can
cause unpredictable performance [63]. Prior solutions have tried to address memory leaks through
a combination of offline bug detectors [61, 64], and runtime systems that probabilistically repair
these bugs [65, 66, 67].
Replacing manual deallocation of memory in unmanaged languages with a sound and efficient
garbage collector (GC) would address all of the above problems by guaranteeing temporal memory
safety, avoiding memory leaks, and reducing programmer burden. Unfortunately, a sound GC for
weakly-typed languages like C/C++ has remained elusive.
A sound GC is one that guarantees to not free an object that is accessed later 1. Typically,
a sound mark-and-sweep GC [68] automatically reclaims memory at runtime by freeing a set of
objects that can be guaranteed to be unreachable from a set of “root” pointers (pointers in global
variables, stack variables, and registers). To compute this set at runtime, given a pointer, a GC
should be able to (1) identify a pointer’s dynamic points-to object, that is, the object reached by
dereferencing the pointer, and (2) locate all the pointers contained in that reachable object. We refer
to the latter set as the pointers-within set for an object. In strongly-typed, memory-safe languages
like Java, both of these operations are straightforward [69]. A pointer’s value can be used to
identify its dynamic points-to object due to spatial memory safety [70], and the pointers-within set
of an object can be easily determined due to the strong type system.
C/C++, however, is weakly-typed. Pointer values can reside in, or be computed from, non-
pointer variables, making it difficult to locate them within a reachable object at runtime. Even
if we can locate all the locations with pointer values, they are not guaranteed to point within the
referenced objects. This is true even in spatially memory safe programs, as a pointer value may
1Ideally GCs would free objects that will not be accessed later, but real GCs settle for the cannot be accessed
approximation.
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be arbitrarily transformed to point away from the object, then manipulated back just before a
dereference. Such pointer manipulations are regularly used in low-level systems code [71].
Prior works on GC for C/C++ [72, 73] have tried to overcome some of these problems using
value-based heuristics, but these works do not guarantee soundness. They assume that only mem-
ory locations with values within an allocated heap object’s address range are valid pointers, and
that the value points within the referent object. This assumption is unsound as they cannot identify
the referent object when a pointer value goes out-of-bounds due to arbitrary pointer manipulations
allowed in C/C++. They are also imprecise, and therefore, prone to memory leaks when non-
pointer locations hold values that happen to be within the heap address range. Finally, they have to
examine the value of every reachable memory location to determine if it is a pointer or not, leading
to higher performance overhead.
We design the first sound GC for C/C++ called Provenance-based Garbage Collection (PROV-
GC). We observe that a C/C++ program cannot create a pointer out-of-thin-air; instead, pointer
values must be derived from a valid pointer source. Valid pointer sources are from allocation func-
tions (e.g. malloc) and the address-of (&) operator. These pointer values subsequently propagate
to other variables either through explicit data-flow or implicit control-flow. Thus, our key idea is
to use dynamic information-flow tracking to soundly and precisely determine the set of all mem-
ory locations that hold values derived from pointers, and the object locations they point-to. Our
mark-and-sweep GC uses this information to soundly reclaim unreachable objects.
Conventional dynamic information-flow tracking (DIFT), however, is known to incur signifi-
cant performance overhead, slowing execution down by several times [26]. This is due to the need
to execute a “monitor” typically for every instruction that could propagate a “taint”. Furthermore,
taint propagation through implicit control-flow (a necessity for us to ensure soundness) is known to
be not only expensive in terms of performance, but also can imprecisely taint a significant fraction
of memory locations [26].
We observe several optimization opportunities that we exploit using hybrid taint analysis [36]
to realize a low-overhead DIFT for pointer provenance. A common property that our static analysis
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exploits is that if an instruction destination operand’s taint meta-data is guaranteed to not change,
then the taint monitor for that instruction can be elided. This property holds true for instructions
that are non-pointer operations (e.g., inta = intb * 10;), which is the vast majority of the
instructions executed. We also show that if an instruction’s destination operand is a statically de-
clared pointer and its source operand is guaranteed to be a “safe” pointer (value points within the
object), then its taint value is known at compile time, and therefore a runtime monitor is unnec-
essary (e.g., int* ptr = safe_ptr;). This category includes common pointer assignments,
where the pointer has not been manipulated arithmetically. Finally, if the source and destination
operands of an instruction are the same (e.g., ptr = ptr+4;), then there is no need to update the
destination’s taints.
Somewhat surprisingly, tracking implicit information flows, known to be intractable in general,
turns out to be practical for pointer provenance. Conditional branches dependent on pointer vari-
ables can propagate taint implicitly to its control-dependent instructions. While we do not expect
reasonable programmers to use such programming constructs, to realize sound GC, we must con-
sider its possibility, as they are legal in C/C++. Fortunately, we are able to show that when branch
conditions are based on comparisons between in-bounds pointers or with NULL value, there is in-
sufficient implicit information flow to require dynamic tracking. While we need modest dynamic
checks to establish that pointer values are in-bounds, we never have to propagate implicit flow for
the programs we studied.
Finally, to prove the above properties statically to aggressively elide dynamic taint monitors,
we apply Cautiously Optimistic Program Analysis (COPA) [1, 36]. OHA uses profiled likely
invariants to predicate the whole-program context-sensitive flow-sensitive static taint analysis.
The C standard [74] specifies several restrictions on using pointers and operations that can be
performed on pointer types. We show that assuming these properties benefits our pointer prove-
nance tracking significantly, and reduces the overall cost of GC for standard-compliant programs.
We provide solutions with and without this optimization, because, in practice, there are many pro-
grams that regularly violate the standard [75], and as such they require provenance tracking without
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optimizations that depend on these C standard specifications.
We evaluate our PROV-GC tool on several long-running large applications as well as memory-
intensive benchmark programs. Unlike the Boehm-Demers-Weiser GC (BDW-GC) [73], PROV-
GC is sound. For well-behaved programs that are C standards-compliant, we pay only an addi-
tional 16% average performance cost to dynamically track pointer provenance. Of which, 14%
is due to explicit data-flow tracking, and the remaining is to track implicit-flow. We find that our
optimistic optimizations that elide dynamic monitors are very effective with adequate profiling.
Without them, we see nearly 8× slowdown. In addition to soundness, compared to BDW-GC, the
performance of our GC invocation is about 13% faster, as we avoid scanning, and reclaim about
6% more memory per GC invocation due to our GC’s improved precision.
16% performance overhead of our GC is especially appealing as it obviates the need for a
slower dynamic temporal safety solution (60% overhead [62]), besides reducing programming
burden and avoiding memory leaks.
We make the following contributions in this paper:
• We present PROV-GC, a GC that is sound for all legal C/C++ programs. Previous GC solutions
for C/C++ are unsound as they might free reachable objects.
• We present the idea of dynamic pointer provenance, and use it to realize a sound GC for C/C++.
• We show how we can elide taint monitors for a vast majority of instructions such as operations
on non-pointers, “safe” pointers, etc.
• We show tracking implicit information-flow in the context of pointer provenance is necessary
and practically feasible.
• We show how the C standard specifications induce a significantly improved provenance tracking
solution for standard-compliant programs.
• We apply optimistic hybrid analysis [1] to optimize dynamic pointer provenance and realize an
efficient GC that incurs 16% overhead. This overhead is much lower than dynamic temporal
safety checking, and it avoids memory leaks and reduces programmer burden.
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4.2 Garbage Collection for C/C++
We briefly discuss the motivation for using GC in weakly-typed languages like C/C++, and the
unsolved problems in realizing a sound GC for them.
4.2.1 Why GC for C/C++?
GC obviates the need for manual memory management and thereby eliminates two common
classes of bugs in unmanaged languages: memory leaks and use-after-free [63, 61]. Memory leaks
and use-after-free bugs are considered important classes of bugs and thus have received significant
attention from academia and industry, who have tried to address these bugs through a variety of
methods. For memory leaks, there exists a number of offline debugging tools and runtime proba-
bilistic methods to mitigate the ill effects of these bugs [63, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82]. We argue
that GC for C/C++ would address the memory leak problem more comprehensively than these
methods.
Use-after-free bugs are particularly important because they compromise system security. These
bugs violate temporal memory safety [6], which along with spatial safety is necessary to ensure full
memory safety. Recognizing the importance of memory safety, even commodity processors (e.g.,
Intel MPX) [83] have started providing specialized hardware support for efficiently implementing
spatial memory safety checks. Spatial memory safety, however, solves only part of the problem.
Efficiently guaranteeing temporal safety remains expensive, as state-of-the-art solutions incur ∼
60% performance overheads [62].
We argue that if we can realize a sound and efficient GC for C/C++, it would not only reduce
the burden on future software development, but also help improve reliability and security of both
future and legacy systems. If the execution time overhead of GC can be made lower than the
overhead of other temporal safety solutions, then it certainly would be a superior solution, as it not
only removes temporal errors, but also improves programmability.
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4.2.2 GC and its Pointer Data Requirements
Identifying dead objects precisely at a given instant of a program’s execution is hard as it depends
on future execution. Therefore, current GCs conservatively identify live objects by assuming that
the set of all “reachable” objects from a “root” set of pointers are live. The root-set consists of all
pointers in the registers, global and stack address space. A reachable object can still be dead as it
may never get referenced in future. Current GCs use either incremental mark-and-sweep [73] or
reference counting [84, 85] to compute reachability. In this paper, we use mark-and-sweep, though
our provenance-based approach could also be used by a reference-counting GC.
When a mark-sweep GC is invoked, it performs two separate steps: marking computes the live
set of objects that are transitively reachable from a root set of pointers, and sweeping reclaims
memory from unreachable objects. To perform the reachability analysis, the mark step requires
two crucial pieces of information about pointers: a pointer’s points-to object (PT), and an object’s
pointers-within set (PW). The points-to object of a pointer is the dynamic object that can be
dereferenced using that pointer. The pointers-within set of an object is the set of all pointers that
are contained within that object.
Both points-to and pointers-within data are straightforward to determine soundly and precisely
in type and memory safe languages such as Java, Python, and C#. The points-to object of a
pointer can be determined from its value due to spatial memory safety. That is, a pointer’s value
is guaranteed to be within the address range of its points-to object. Furthermore, due to type
safety, given an object, it is possible to precisely and quickly determine its pointers-within set,
because only variables that are typed as pointers can hold pointer data; non-pointer variables cannot
hold pointer data. Determining points-to and pointers-within data in weakly-typed languages like
C/C++, however, is a significant challenge as we discuss next.
4.2.3 Value-based GCs for C/C++ is Unsound
All prior attempts to provide GC for C/C++ use value-based heuristics to compute points-to and
pointers-within information. For example, the best-known such work [73] computes the pointers-
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1 typedef struct { uintptr_t val, xptr; } xorlist;
2 xorlist *head = NULL, *tail = NULL;
3 void traverse(xorlist *start) {
4 xorlist *prev = NULL, *curr = start;
5 while (curr) {
6 printf("%ld\n", curr->val);
7 uintptr_t next = (uintptr_t)
prev ˆ curr->xptr;
8 prev = curr;
9 curr = next;
10 }
11 }






A B C D E
val 01 23 45 67 89
xptr head ⊥⊕B A⊕C B⊕D C⊕E D⊕⊥ tail
Figure 4.1: XOR linked list – Doubly Linked Lists can save space by storing the XOR of previ-
ous and next node pointers in a single integer location; uintptr_t is sufficiently long to hold
pointer values. The inner nodes never store literal pointer values, but have sufficient information
to reconstruct valid pointers to its two adjacent nodes.
within set of an object by scanning every pointer-sized field in the object and checking if its value
falls within the address range of any allocated heap object. If the check succeeds, then that field is
assumed to be a pointer, and the points-to object for that field is assumed to be the allocated heap
object whose address range includes that field’s value.
Value-based GCs work by assuming that any allocated heap object that may be referenced in the
future has at least one live register or memory location pointing to it at all times. This assumption
may be violated, for instance, if the C program breaks any of the following three assumptions:
(A1) Pointers are only stored in variables that are declared to be pointers or in sufficiently large
integral type that can hold a pointer. (A2) If a memory location’s value falls within the bounds
of an allocated heap object then it is a valid pointer, or else it is a non-pointer. (A3) A pointer
discovered through its value is assumed to point within its points-to object. Value-based GCs are
unsound whenever any of the above invariants is violated.
In C/C++, even legal programs can violate these three assumptions because C/C++ has a weak
type system and allows programs to store pointer values in integers and manipulate them in arbi-
trary ways. Fig. 4.1 shows an example of a XOR linked list, a clever representation of a doubly
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linked list used in memory constrained embedded systems [86]. Each node stores the XOR of
pointers in the two directions and recovers them using XOR operations during traversal. Note that
none of the inner nodes store literal values of pointers, but have information encoded to reconstruct
two valid pointers. A purely value-based GC approach can incorrectly reclaim objects pointed to
by such hidden pointers, e.g. node C’s address is not stored literally anywhere in the program state.
This is a legal C program which can break the correctness of a value-based GC. More extreme ex-
amples are also possible via casting and other manipulations; for example, a program may split a
pointer into several smaller integers then reconstruct the pointer later; this would violate all three
assumptions.
Value-based GCs can also be imprecise because they may think a non-pointer is a pointer
when its value happens to lie within the heap address range. If this non-pointer’s value points-to
an unreachable object, then GC would avoid reclaiming it. This can lead to memory leaks and
lower performance. There has been follow-up work [87, 88] that addressed this problem by adding
another assumption that pointers only reside in declared pointer typed variables. This approach
achieves greater precision, but sacrifices even more soundness, as it would ignore an integer value
derived from a pointer through a cast.
Value-based GCs can also incur significant overhead while scanning the state space for point-
ers. Given a reachable object, GC has to scan each of its fields, and check if it could be a valid
pointer or not. The check involves looking into a data-structure that maintains the address ranges
of all heap objects.
In this work, we improve upon pure value-based GCs by using dynamic pointer provenance
to soundly and precisely determine the set of all pointers and the objects they point-to. Also, this
can quickly identify pointers-within set of an object without scanning each field, improving GC
performance.
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4.2.4 Need for Sound GCs
Guaranteeing correct GC behavior– i.e. objects reachable from the root set of pointers will not be
freed, is important for all programs in the same way that it is important to have a sound compiler
or runtime. Value-based GCs impose additional restrictions, as seen in §4.2.3 earlier, making them
work correctly only on a subset of the language. These language properties might not be followed
by legacy programs, and can be generally difficult to verify for new programs and compiler imple-
mentations that strive to conform to the standards but still may not. Moreover, new programs also
reuse existing library code. So, there is value in supporting sound GC behavior for all programs
without imposing additional restrictions on the language itself.
4.3 Provenance-Based Garbage Collection
We address these problems by designing a sound and efficient provenance-based garbage collector.
We will first motivate how a provenance-based garbage collector solves the soundness issue, and
outline a simple-but-sound strawman GC. Then, we discuss optimizations to reduce the overhead
of our strawman GC, leading to a provenance-based GC that is both fast and sound.
We assume that, aside from temporal safety errors, the given program is a valid C/C++ pro-
gram and obeys the properties necessary for the compiler and hardware to guarantee well-defined
behavior. This includes spatial memory safety [70] and data-race-freedom [89], which many prior
works have addressed.
4.3.1 The Soundness of Provenance-Based GC
We propose that instead of using the value of a pointer to identify its points-to set, a GC can use
the provenance of the pointer to soundly derive its dynamic points-to set.
The soundness of our provenance-based solution is based on the assumption that allocated
heap memory addresses cannot appear out-of-thin-air. That is, without knowing the return value
of an allocation function (e.g. malloc in C), it is impossible for the programmer to compute
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the address of any dynamically allocated heap object. This assumption is true of most real type-
unsafe languages, including C. Given this assumption, any well-behaved program must ensure
that any heap addresses dereferenced by a load or store operation are derived from the return of
heap allocation functions. Consequently, an object allocated within the heap is only reachable in
the future if it has one or more live register or memory values (henceforth values) which draw
provenance from its allocation function’s return value.
Since a heap pointer value cannot appear out-of-thin-air, and all pointers must have a prove-
nance to at least one valid allocation, it is therefore sufficient to track all points-to sets for all
pointers to reconstruct all currently reachable objects.
4.3.2 A Simple Provenance-Based GC
To show how pointer provenance can construct a sound GC, we present a simple, strawman design
of a provenance-based GC.
Terminology: We refer to registers and memory locations simply as location. A pointer refers
to a location whose value is directly or indirectly derived from one or more allocation return values.
The points-to set of a location refers to the set of object allocations from which the pointer is
derived. The points-to set is the complete set of objects that the pointer may be used to access in
the future. A memory location with empty points-to set is not a pointer.
Our strawman GC will naively track the points-to set for every register or memory location
(henceforth location) in an execution by constructing a map from each location to the set of heap
object allocations its value is derived from.
To dynamically track the points-to sets of all pointers, we apply a standard dynamic information
flow (DIFT) policy, treating all heap object allocations as sources and using both data-flow and
implicit-flow taint tracking. More specifically, the program begins with each location’s points-
to set empty. Whenever an allocation function returns, we add that allocation to the destination
location’s points-to set. Thereafter, whenever the program modifies a location, the points-to set of
that location will be updated to contain the union of the points-to sets of any pointers it depends
55
on. We note that for this analysis to be sound, when a location is modified, it must consider not
only data-flow dependencies, but also any implicit control-flow dependencies as well (e.g., when
branch conditions depend on pointers).
A properly constructed DIFT analysis [90, 31] will, by construction, ensure that the points-to
set of each pointer is conservative. That is, if the pointer could be used to dereference an object in
the future, that object will be within that pointer’s points-to set.
In order to avoid scanning memory to locate pointers, we also maintain a pointers-within set
mapping for each allocated heap object. The pointers-within set will logically contain the memory
location of every pointer within the allocated heap object. The pointers-within set for an object can
be trivially maintained by initializing the set to empty when the object is allocated, then adding a
pointer to the set whenever such a pointer is stored to a location within the object.
Once the collection phase of the GC actually begins, our GC only needs to iterate through the
root set of the program (any locations statically reachable - globals, or reachable from any stack
frames and registers), add these locations to a temporary set called the working set. Then, the GC
will iterate through the working set and for each object in the working set identify all pointers
with the object’s pointers-within set. The GC then adds any objects in the points-to sets of those
pointers to both the working set, and a set of live objects. This process iterates until the live set
does not change. Any object not in the set of live objects at the conclusion of the algorithm may
then be reclaimed.
While this straw-man solution provides a sound GC, tracking provenance metadata through all
operations and through implicit flows will typically be very expensive. Fortunately, most instruc-
tions operate on non-pointers. Also, in the common case, pointers stay within object bounds, and
do not propagate pointer data to other locations through control flow. We leverage these properties
to significantly reduce the amount of provenance tracking required to construct a sound GC.
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4.3.3 Optimizing Explicit Provenance
The strawman system described earlier requires dynamically inserting a monitor (to propagate
points-to set) on nearly every instruction within the program. This would result in very high
overheads [26]. However, we observe that for a significant fraction of instructions, its runtime
monitors do not change their destination operands’ points-to (taint). We use static analysis to elide
these dynamic monitors without losing soundness. This section discusses three optimizations that
elide such redundant monitors: 1) eliding non-pointer tracking, 2) eliding “safe-pointer” tracking,
and 3) eliding monitors for pointers with the same operands.
Non-Pointer Tracking Elision
Within C programs, the vast majority of computation operates on data which is not logically de-
rived from pointer values. If we can statically prove that a location within the program has an
empty points-to set, then that location is a non-pointer, and the dynamic run-time system need
not dynamically track the points-to set of that location. This detection can be accomplished by
using static information flow analysis [54, 36] to compute a sound may points-to set, then eliding
dynamic points-to set operations on locations with an empty may points-to set. For the example in
Fig. 4.2, we can trivially elide any provenance tracking for line 5 since neither of its operands have
data-flow from any pointers, in fact they are constants.
Safe Pointer Tracking Elision
Next, we observe that the vast majority of pointers in C programs (1) have exactly one object in
their points-to sets (singleton set) and (2) have a value within the allocated memory range of that
object (in-bounds). We call these safe pointers.
Safe pointers are handled correctly by value-based GC. Because the pointer value can be used
to dereference only one object, and since the pointer value is in-bounds, we can use its value to
determine its object. For the same reasons, we do not need to track the points-to set of any location
in the program we know is a safe pointer, as we can identify its points-to set from its value at
collection time.
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1 void explicit_flow() {
2 unsigned int n = 10, o = 1000;
3 obj* A = malloc1(n*sizeof(obj)); //PT (A) = {malloc1}
4 char** B = malloc2(n*sizeof(obj));//PT (B) = {malloc2}
5 long z = o / n; // elided by E1
6 char* p = A; // elided by E2
7 long d = B - A; // PT (d) = {malloc2,malloc1}
...
8 for (unsigned int i = 0; i < n * sizeof(obj); i++) {
9 char* q = p + d; // PT (q) = {malloc1,malloc2}, elided by E2 and line 10
10 *q = p;
11 p = p + 1; // PT (p) = {malloc1}, elided by E3
12 }
13 }
Figure 4.2: Explicit pointer provenance propagation
To perform this optimization, we perform a static data-flow analysis to identify which instruc-
tions in a program must define safe pointers. While statically identifying safe pointers precisely
in a program is hard, we construct a sound but imprecise data-flow analysis as follows. A pointer
defined by the assignment from an allocation function is clearly safe. Assignment from a safe
pointer is also safe. The result of any operation is safe, provided it satisfies two conditions: (1)
the operation has only one pointer operand, and that operand is a safe pointer, and (2) the opera-
tion is guaranteed to not modify the pointer to point outside the bounds of the object it references
(provably in-bounds).
Leveraging Dereferences Our static safe-pointer identification methodology is conservative,
and consequently will falsely identify many safe-pointers as non-safe. It is sound, but potentially
introduces unnecessary dynamic checks. To help identify additional sources of safe pointers, we
observe that any time an address is dereferenced, it must be an in-bounds pointer, otherwise the
program would have undefined behavior (violating spatial memory safety). If we can additionally
prove that the dereferenced pointer’s points-to set is a singleton set, then we know the pointer is a
safe pointer. To accomplish this, we construct another static taint analysis, with the goal of iden-
tifying singleton taint sets. To construct such an analysis, we observe that a points-to set can only
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propagate from a singleton-set to a non-singleton-set when it depends on multiple pointers. There-
fore, a static analysis can determine pointers that must have singleton points-to sets by checking
if its transitive dependency set contains no operations with multiple pointer dependencies. We
leverage this must-have singleton-points-to sets analysis with our observation about dereferenced
pointers being in-bounds to identify an additional source of safe-pointers: dereferenced pointers
with singleton points-to sets.
Equivalent Points-to Propagation
Our third optimization exploits the fact that many pointer redefinitions do not change the points-to
metadata, and therefore they can be elided. This is trivially true when the source and destination
pointer operands are the same. For the example in Fig. 4.2, the provenance (points-to) of p on
line 11 cannot change. It is possible for arithmetic operation on a pointer to result in an out-of-
bounds value. But in a well-defined (spatially memory safe) program, it cannot be dereferenced
before it is reverted back to be within bounds. We use a static data-flow analysis that elides the
monitor for an instruction when it can be proven that the provenance of its destination operand is
same as its source either directly or transitively through data-flow.
A related optimization is that, if the provenance of a location remains constant within a loop,
our analysis hoists it out of the loop through a loop invariant code motion [91].
In summary, we can elide provenance tracking operations when –
E1 All source operands have empty provenance.
E2 The resultant pointer is safe.
E3 The resultant pointer is assigned to the same identifier as the source operand, directly or via
temporaries.
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4.3.4 Optimizing Implicit Provenance
Although rare, it is both possible and legal for weakly-typed programs to deconstruct and re-
construct pointers through implicit flow operations, as shown in Fig. 4.3. Traditionally, implicit
information flow DIFT is known to have severe limitations as the majority of locations can get
tainted, and doing so, as proposed in our strawman solution would result in very poor heap ob-
ject collection rates and slow provenance tracking performance. However, recall that the goal of
a sound provenance-based GC is not to ensure that no taint is lost, as a security analysis would,
but rather to ensure that a pointer cannot be reconstructed from any provenance data. In order
for an address range to be reconstructed, there must be enough data about the pointer propagated
implicitly to definitely reconstruct it. We observe that for many comparisons, the binary outcome
of that comparison doesn’t propagate enough information to reconstruct the pointer, even if the
comparison were made many times.
We consider two specific comparison cases for a valid in-bounds pointer ptr1:
I1 == or != NULL
I2 == or != another valid in-bounds pointer ptr2
The outcome of the comparison determines the value of ptr1 from two possible partitions –
S1 = {NULL} or {ptr2} and S2 = the set of all other valid pointers. When in S1 = {NULL},
ptr1 is an invalid pointer. When in S1 = {ptr2}, ptr1’s (or ptr2’s) value cannot be deduced
from their equality alone but must be explicitly carried in ptr1 (or ptr2). When in S2, we have
eliminated only one possible value and still need sufficient information to determine ptr1’s value.
1 long implicit_copy(long ptr) {
2 long hidden_ptr = 0;
3 for (int i = 0; i < sizeof(ptr) * 8; i++ {
4 long mask = 1 << i;
5 if (ptr & mask) {




10 } Figure 4.3: Copying a pointer via implicit flow
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Sufficient information to recover the pointer must then propagate either via at least one explicit
data flow, or via a series of 264−1 equality comparisons, which are unreasonable to do in any prac-
tical amount of time. So, we can safely elide tracking implicit provenance propagation via these
constrained comparisons. For all other comparisons, our sound GC propagates the provenance set
through implicit operations.
The above condition for in-bounds pointers can be guaranteed statically for safe pointers but
must be checked dynamically for unsafe pointers. Prior work on memory safety has enabled ef-
ficient spatial bounds checking [70, 7], and checks required for pointer comparisons only incur a
fraction of those costs. Note, we cannot assume that the pointers used in comparison are guar-
anteed to be in-bounds. They may be out-of-bounds, and later become in-bounds before being
dereferenced.
1 obj* A = malloc1(n*sizeof(obj)); //PT (A) = {malloc1}
2 char** B = malloc2(n*sizeof(obj));//PT (B) = {malloc2}
3 unsigned int o = 1000;
4 bool flag = false;
5 long x = A + o; // PT (x) = {malloc1}
6 long y = B - o; // PT (y) = {malloc2}
7 char* p = A;
8 if (B != NULL) flag = true; // elided by I1
...
9 if (A == p) flag = true; // elided by I2
...
10 if (x == y) {
11 p = A + 2*o; // PT (p) = PT (A) ∪ PT (x) ∪ PT (y) = {malloc1,malloc2}
12 }
Figure 4.4: Implicit pointer provenance propagation
Consider the example code in Fig. 4.4. After the comparison on line 8, the flag being true
simply indicates that the pointer B is non-NULL which cannot be used to recover a valid pointer
within object B. Similarly after line 9, if flag is true (or false), you still need either (or both)
of A and p to access the object(s). However, line 10 propagates sufficient information to recover a
pointer value. When x == y succeeds, it encodes the distance between objects A and B, so that
even if all pointers to B are discarded, a pointer to B can still be recovered as in line 11. To handle
this information flow, we add the pointer provenance of line 10’s comparison operands, x and y, to
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the control-dependent line 11’s result p.
4.3.5 Other Points-To Set Propagation Channels
Pointer information can escape the managed address space and leak through external channels,
such as by writing them to the file-system and reading them back. Safely handling such channels
would require elaborate mechanisms to preserve the pointer provenance of such escaping values,
and treat them as always live to exclude from being collected. Such pointer propagation chan-
nels being practically rare, we conservatively disable GC when any value escaping the program’s
address-space has non-empty pointer provenance.
4.3.6 C Standard for Pointers
The C standard [74] places certain restrictions on the possible values of pointers, limiting ac-
ceptable pointer behaviors in correct programs with well defined behaviors on all platforms. The
standard disallows arbitrary manipulations on pointers [§6.5.6], but allows arbitrary, implemen-
tation defined, conversions between integer and pointer types [§6.3.2.3]. As a result, pointer-
typed values may be in one of three states: (1) in-bounds: well defined in-bounds values, (2)
one-past-end: pointing to a location just past the end of an array, and (3) imp-def: an
implementation-defined value converted from an integer, which is unknown in the general case.
We will now show that PROV-GC can leverage these restrictions to expand the set of safe pointers
(§4.3.3) to significantly reduce pointer provenance tracking.
If we ignore the imp-def case for now, then these properties are clearly highly advantageous
to our garbage collector. Because, if all pointer typed values are in-bounds or one past the end of
an array, then all pointer typed values are safe-pointers by definition. Thus, our GC can apply our
optimization discussed in §4.3.3 for all pointer type values.
The imp-def case does not present an instance of an in-bounds pointer, as it allows an ar-
bitrary value to be present in a pointer. Fortunately, however, the lack of definition between con-
version from an integral to pointer-typed value disallows the program from reasoning about any
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value stored in that pointer, except under very specific conditions covered shortly. As any pointer
in imp-def instance is not defined by the standard, a program cannot portably rely on it to recon-
struct a pointer later, and thus it cannot be used to legally dereference or construct a pointer in the
future, allowing PROV-GC to conservatively treat it as a safe-pointer.
The one exception we referred to is a defined conversion from a pointer value to an integral
value and back as defined in [§7.20.1.4] of the C standard. This conversion applies to intptr_t
values. For these values a void pointer may be converted to an intptr_t type and back. The
conversion is not defined, except when the value stored in intptr_t variable is unchanged. Thus,
any manipulated value of the integer would not have a standard-defined mapping when converted
back to a pointer, and therefore our earlier conclusion for imp-def applies. If the value is un-
changed when it is stored as intptr_t, then when it is converted back to a pointer type, it has to
be either in-bounds or one-past-end.
Note that our example of XOR linked list in Fig. 4.1 complies with the above restrictions
because it only uses intptr_t type to convert pointers into integers, and it recovers the exact
value of the original pointer using XOR operation before converting it back to a valid pointer.
We note that this optimization relies on the programmer writing strictly standard compliant
portable C code. Many implementations of C compilers do define mappings when performing
pointer to integer conversions, and many code-bases do legally (but not portably) rely on these
facets of the compiler [92, 75]. As a result, we provide solutions with and without this optimization.
Programs that strictly adhere to the C standard can take advantage of this optimization.
4.3.7 Cautiously Optimistic Program Analysis
Provenance-based GC relies heavily on dynamic taint tracking [31], and consequently can incur
significant overheads. Fortunately, recent work has shown that dynamic taint tracking can signifi-
cantly benefit from a technique known as optimistic hybrid analysis [36, 1]. Cautiously Optimistic
Program Analysis (COPA) is a method of dynamic analysis optimization based on the insight that
optimization should be done for the common case. Traditional hybrid analyses use a sound static
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analysis to reason about all possible future executions (and many impossible ones, due to over-
approximation). However, when optimizing a dynamic analysis, the optimization need only care
about the execution that will actually happen. To help approximate this, COPA uses a predicated
static analysis, which takes in a set of assumptions (called likely invariants), and only guarantees
that the static analysis is sound for executions in which these likely invariants actually remain in-
variant. Assuming these invariants allows the static analysis to reason much more effectively about
the analyzed program, dramatically improving its ability to reduce dynamic checks. In this case,
it allows the dynamic taint analysis to be aggressively optimized by eliding taint tracking monitors
along paths that do not propagate taints in the predicated static analysis. A runtime system then
checks the likely invariants at runtime, and falls back to a conservative analysis if the invariants
ever fail.
We leverage COPA to improve our provenance-based GC in two ways: (1) we use it to improve
our static empty points-to analysis in §4.3.3, (2) we assume pointers used in comparisons are in-
bounds, reducing the amount of implicit flow tracking done in §4.3.4. For our first use of COPA,
we simply apply the same optimizations found in the Iodine tool [36] to improve our common-case
identification of empty may-points-to sets. Our second use is slightly more subtle. A conservative
analysis would require that we propagate implicit flow information for any pointer which may be
out-of-bounds during the I1 and I2 implicit flow checks. However, it is very rare for a pointer
used within a comparison to be out-of-bounds, so we assume the invariant that any pointer used
in a comparison is in-bounds. Using this invariant, we can remove any implicit flow taint tracking
that may occur in the common case, so long as we first dynamically verify that all pointers used
in comparisons for branches are in-bounds. If the check fails before the comparison, we soundly
switch to the conservatively optimized analysis that propagates taint through the implicit flow.
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4.4 PROV-GC Implementation
We present an overview of PROV-GC’s notable features, and its details are presented in [93, §4].
PROV-GC relies on three primary components: (1) a Static Pointer Provenance Analysis (PPA),
(2) a Dynamic Pointer Provenance Tracking (PPT) instrumented on the target program, and (3) a
Provenance-based GC library for use by the target program. Our static analysis, and dynamic
analysis instrumentation is implemented in the LLVM 7.0 compiler infrastructure [37], and the
Provenance-based GC library is a modification of the Boehm-Demers-Weiser GC [73] to use
provenance metadata for GC.
4.4.1 Static Pointer Provenance Analyses
The static analyses classifies all LLVM static single assignment form [94] values in a program
into three partitions– non-pointers, safe-pointers, and unsafe pointers. It uses the same underlying
whole-program context-sensitive data-flow analysis described in §3.4, along with a control-flow
dependence analysis. After creating the predicated program DUG graph, we assign an empty
static points-to set to every value and initialize the set for values defined by pointer sources (e.g.
malloc). It then traverses the whole-program DUG iteratively, accumulating the union of points-
to sets of values that are used in a definition, until all points-to sets reach a fixed point.
Non-Pointers: At the end of this data-flow analysis, all values with empty points-to sets are def-
initely non-pointers, and the rest are may-be pointers. No instrumentation is required for non-
pointers.
Safe Pointers: We further classify may-be pointers into safe and unsafe sets as defined in §4.3.3
by constructing a conservative data-flow analysis identifying must-be safe-pointer operations as
operations which may not pass through unsafe operations. Once we compute this analysis, we
elide points-to set tracking for any safe pointers.
Unsafe Pointers: For the remaining may-be unsafe pointers, we elide equivalent points-to prop-
agations when a manipulated pointer value is assigned back to same source-level identifier as its
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source operand. This is done by mapping LLVM SSA values to their source-level identifiers and
checking if values are assigned transitively to the same identifier along the define-use chain. Re-
maining unsafe pointer operations require both pointers-in and points-to tracking.
Implicit Flow Optimizations Finally, the static analysis optimizes implicit provenance tracking.
When any branch conditional on an equality or inequality comparison has any pointers in the
comparison, we instrument the spatial safety invariant check for the pointer operands and then
optimistically elide the implicit PPT operations. Any other logical comparison used in conditional
branches are always instrumented for all control-dependent value definitions.
4.4.2 Dynamic Pointer Provenance Tracking Instrumentation
After the static provenance analysis, we instrument the target program for dynamic Pointer Prove-
nance Tracking (PPT) operations. This entails three types of pointer metadata operations, and
COPA invariant checks.
Root-set Pointers: We instrument the main entry function to record the locations of all global
values which may hold pointers. Every function, at entry, adds to this record the locations of all
local pointer values and removes them before returning. This ensures that the GC can always locate
statically identified safe pointer locations, and we only need to track the rest.
Pointer Metadata Creation: Any location that could not be statically identified as a non-pointer
has two pieces of metadata associated with it- A pointer flag indicating that it has a safe pointer
value maintained in a shadow memory, or its dynamic points-to set when it’s unsafe. The points-
to set is kept in a splay-tree [95] indexed by the pointer value location to serve range queries
efficiently.
Pointer Metadata Tracking: The shadow memory taint creations, lookups and transfers are ef-
ficiently handled using LLVM DFSan [38] instrumentation. For explicit propagation of unsafe
pointers, the points-to set metadata is computed as union of the sources. For implicit propagation,
we use Iodine’s recovery mechanism to create two paths, with and without the implicit tracking,
based on the spatial safety invariant.
66
COPA Invariant Checks: In addition to all likely invariants used for static data-flow analysis, our
implicit provenance optimizations add additional spatial bounds checks for pointer comparison
operands.
4.4.3 Garbage Collection
PROV-GC keeps an allocation table of active allocations with their base and bound addresses, in-
dexed by their base address. This is exposed to the provenance tracking mechanism for computing
the dynamic points-to and enforcing the spatial safety invariant checks.
PROV-GC uses the dynamic points-to and taint metadata maintained by PPT to compute the
pointers-in set within an object’s bounds, using the splay tree to efficiently search all unsafe point-
ers, and leveraging the one-to-one mapping of heap locations to taint bits in shadow memory to
efficiently lookup safe pointers using bitwise arithmetic.
Garbage collection begins by pushing the root-set of pointers maintained by our root-set track-
ing into a set known as the GC root-set. Then it queries the allocation table to locate remaining
pointers within the bounds of the global data segment and the current stack to include in the GC
root-set. Then marking continues by transitively performing the range-queries into the bounds
of the objects in their points-to set. The range-based query techniques quickly locate all pointer
values within an object’s bounds, much faster than value-based scanning for large objects. Upon
collecting objects, PROV-GC removes the associated metadata through range-deletion operations.
4.4.4 Source Transformations for GC
Running target programs with GC require some source-level changes to communicate between
the collector and the client program. To convey applications’ allocation requests, we replace all
allocation calls e.g. malloc() with corresponding GC_malloc()’s, and remove all free()’s.
Some applications like redis, need to notified by the GC for special handling of deallocated
objects, for which we use BDW-GC interface to register the application specific finalization code.
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4.5 Evaluation
We compare the performance of PROV-GCwith state-of-the-art value-based GC BDW-GC[73].
Our evaluation shows the following:
• Dynamic Pointer Provenance Tracking incurs reasonably low overheads, even for memory-
intensive benchmarks.
• PROV-GC reduces scanning overheads so that individual GC invocations run faster compared to
BDW-GC.
• PROV-GC is the only sound garbage collector, and yet improves memory reclamation rates over
value-based GC and yields benefits similar to other unsound GC solutions [88].
Experimental Setup
We evaluate PROV-GC over several real-world applications including the nginx web server,
postfixmail server, redis database server, vim and SPEC C benchmark programs. The profil-
ing methodology and run configurations for the test programs are identical to that used in §3.5. For
each target program, we create 3 versions: (1) base without GC, (2) bdw-gc with value-based
BDW-GC and (3) prov-gcwith our sound PROV-GC. The base versions use glibc 2.26 al-
locator, except for nginx and rediswhich use jemalloc 5.1.0. All programs are compiled
with clang 7.0 at the -O3 optimization level. We use BDW-GC version 7.4.16 with the par-
allel and incremental collection being disabled (GC_MARKERS=1 GC_DISABLE_INCREMENTAL).
The benchmark programs and the configured GC heap limits are listed in Table 4.1. Finally,
prov-gc compiles the programs with our static analysis that instruments them with the prove-
nance tracking mechanism, and run with the PROV-GC allocator using the same configurations.
4.5.1 Provenance Tracking Overheads
To understand how static analysis can significantly reduce the overhead of provenance tracking, we
run PROV-GC configured only to track provenance (i.e. collection disabled), and then selectively
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Table 4.1: PROV-GC Benchmark configurations
Program base bdw-gcPeak Memory Heap Limit # Collections
perlbench 580 MB 1024 MB 2
bzip2 856 MB 1024 MB 3
gcc† 940 MB 1024 MB ×
mcf 832 MB 1024 MB 3
gobmk 32 MB 32 MB 2
hmmer 60 MB 48 MB 1
sjeng 180 MB 256 MB 2
libquantum 108 MB 128 MB 2
h264ref 68 MB 48 MB 2
nginx∗ 26 MB 16 MB 2
redis∗ 316 MB 512 MB 3
postfix 588 MB 1024 MB 4
vim 244 MB 512 MB 3
†we’re unable to run gcc with bdw-gc, ∗nginx and redis employ their own custom GC allocators
enable optimizations within PROV-GC. Our results can be found in Fig. 4.5: each benchmark
shows 4 different overheads normalized to base– ‘Cons’ uses the sound static analyses described
in §4.3.3 and §4.3.4 to optimize provenance tracking; ‘Opt’ further optimizes using optimistic
hybrid analysis as described in §4.3.7; the two ‘+C’ versions then use the specific optimization
in §4.3.6 leveraging the C Standard. We find that the overhead of provenance tracking, including
implicit flow tracking, for our benchmarks is actually quite reasonable, with an average overhead
of 16% (11% excluding gcc). This result is actually quite surprising, as this number includes the
cost of implicit flow tracking, which is known for dramatically increasing taint tracking overhead
due to over-tainting. However, with our combination of static analyses, and optimistic hybrid
analyses, we are able to dramatically reduce this result to only 16%. Note that this solution requires
strict adherence to the C standard, which is stronger than spatial memory safety. While spatial
memory safety only checks that pointers are in-bounds when dereferenced, the standard requires
that pointers be in-bounds always for well-defined behavior. Therefore, the design point that does
not assume the C Standard is also quite useful in supporting sound GC for legacy non-portable C
programs that do not follow this strict standard. Programs that violate the standard [92, 75] can
still employ sound GC, although incurring a higher overhead of ∼ 60% (37% excluding gcc).


































































































































































































































































































Figure 4.5: Result: PROV-GC dynamic pointer provenance tracking overheads
Cons: optimizes dynamic provenance tracking using sound static analyses, Opt: uses optimistic hybrid analysis.
+C: optimizes for C Standard-compliant programs as discussed in §4.3.6.
The solid portions of bars represent the overheads of tracking provenance via explicit flows, and the striped
portions represent that for implicit flows. Execution times are normalized to base, i.e. without GC.
overhead [62]).
gcc is a very large program for which whole program context-sensitive pointer analysis does
not scale, even when predicated using optimistic hybrid analysis. The context-insensitive pointer
analysis for this program results in much less precise may-alias relations. Consequently, non-
pointers can be imprecisely classified as may-be pointers, and safe pointers to be unsafe. This
induces much weaker static optimizations resulting in severe dynamic overheads. The average
overhead of provenance tracking excluding gcc is 11%.
We further study the various sources of our provenance tracking overheads in detail. For ex-
plicit provenance tracking, ∼ 21% of its overhead attributes to the provenance metadata creation–
i.e. when a safe pointer becomes unsafe, we compute the provenance metadata from the value of
the source safe pointer. This substantiates that very few pointer values become tainted as unsafe
and the remainder of the overhead is in tracking their provenance propagation. On the contrary, for
implicit provenance tracking, the overhead is entirely in validating the invariant of spatial bounds
checking for pointer comparisons, as we discussed in §4.3.4, and none of our tested programs
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ever violate these checks. The framework overheads of checking the other optimistic invariant
assumptions are negligibly low.
Summary : Optimistic hybrid analysis combined with our optimizations in §4.3.3 significantly
elides tracking operations for most non-pointers and safe pointers, and tracks only few unsafe
pointers. Pointer provenances do not propagate implicitly via common pointer comparisons as
we reasoned in §4.3.4, and checking for that involves a subset of spatial memory safety check
overheads. The cost of soundness for GC in our Pointer Provenance Tracking is ∼ 16%. This is
significantly lower than the cost of providing Temporal Memory Safety (∼ 60% [62]).
Note that, to the best of our knowledge, these benchmarks do not exercise unsafe pointer propa-
gations and BDW-GC also works correctly for them. For the programs that exercise unsafe pointer
manipulations, BDW-GC might break, but PROV-GC still works correctly. However, programs
with pathological pointer manipulations may incur higher overheads with PROV-GC. So, PROV-
GC provides soundness in all cases without hurting performance significantly in the common case.
4.5.2 GC Overheads
Next, we show how the presence of dynamic pointer provenance information can be used to achieve
an efficient GC solution. To study this effect, we compare the collection times of a single GC in-
vocation with prov-gc against that of bdw-gc. Since our pointer provenance metadata is main-
tained separately outside the GC managed heap, the first GC invocation of a program happens at the
same execution point under consistent configurations. But, since bdw-gc can reclaim unsoundly
and retain imprecisely, the subsequent GC invocations can happen at different program states. So
for equivalent comparison, we only measure collection statistics upon the first GC invocation and
then terminate the program.
Fig. 4.6 plots the overhead of a GC invocation with prov-gc normalized to that with bdw-gc.
prov-gc generally improves the GC collection times compared to bdw-gc and completes col-
























Figure 4.6: Result: PROV-GC reduces overhead of a single GC invocation; collection time is
normalized to that of bdw-gc
tions to locate potential pointers for marking, prov-gc can locate values with pointer provenance
using the fast range queries over its metadata. This benefit can compound while marking large
allocations with sparsely located pointers.
We study the effectiveness of provenance-based GC in terms of its memory retention rate, i.e.
the fraction of heap size after and before a GC invocation, once again in our previous single GC
invocation setup. Fig. 4.7 plots the mean memory retention for each program. prov-gc is strictly
more precise than bdw-gc and reclaims as much as 21% more memory in the case of vim, and
∼ 6% more on average. This benefit varies with the programs’ memory usage patterns, and is
low for programs with a stable working set like mcf, hmmer and sjeng. Prior works on Precise
GC [88] for C report better reclamation (up to ∼ 70%) benefits on a different set of applications,





























Figure 4.7: Result: PROV-GC reclaims more memory per GC invocation
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4.5.3 GC Heap Size Sensitivity
Finally, we look at the end-to-end performance of prov-gc and its space-time trade-off with
varying heap sizes. Fig. 4.8 shows the execution times of prov-gc and bdw-gc normalized to
that of base for four benchmark programs with varying heap size limits on the x-axes; the labeled
numbers on the plots indicate the number of GC invocations per benchmark configuration. Over-
all, prov-gc runs slower than bdw-gc and the difference between their execution time plots is
attributed to the dynamic Pointer Provenance Tracking overheads. We observe that more frequent
GC invocations at lower heap size limits lead to higher execution time overheads. This behav-
ior is consistent for both bdw-gc and prov-gc although interestingly prov-gc’s improved
































































Figure 4.8: Result: PROV-GC performance with varying heap limits
4.5.4 Memory Overheads
To evaluate the additional memory overheads of maintaining the pointer metadata, we measure the
sizes of the two metadata structures- shadow memory, and splay tree, at collection time. Programs
running with PROV-GC have 30.8% more memory footprint on average, with perlbench seeing
the highest overhead of 35.1%. Of this memory overhead, ∼ 27.1% is due to the shadow memory
structure, and ∼ 3.6% is occupied by the splay tree structure.
Tracking pointer provenance metadata incurs some additional memory overheads, and hence
may not be suitable for applications with large memory footprints in memory constrained environ-
ments. However, the advantages of sound garbage collection are much prominent in contrast.
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Limitations
Possible leaks: All GCs are imprecise and can lead to memory leaks. PROV-GC too may suffer
from memory leaks in pathological cases where it finds benign data-flows from pointer values, e.g.
when certain bits of malloc return addresses are checked for bookkeeping purposes. In practice
we do not observe such behavior.
Thread safety: Prov-GC’s implementation currently supports single-threaded programs. Future
work can address this limitation by combining prior work on data-flow analysis for concurrent pro-
grams [96] with our optimistic hybrid analysis techniques to construct a static pointer provenance
analysis for concurrent programs. The C11 standard, by requiring data-race freedom, allows ex-
tending the sequential reasoning of many program analyses to concurrent programs [97]. Note that
the provenance metadata accesses do not introduce any new races, and the per-word taint metadata
is already covered by the program’s existing synchronization for shared objects.
4.6 Related Work
In §4.2, we discussed the limitations of well-known value-based GC for C w.r.t soundness, preci-
sion, and GC performance. Below we relate relevant GC work that address each of these problems
to our work. We also discuss work that relates to the techniques (provenance) we use and the added
benefits of GC (temporal safety).
GC Soundness: Prior work has developed compiler checks to reject C/C++ programs that may vi-
olate soundness of value-based GC. Precise GC solutions check that programs do not store pointer
values into integral types [87, 88] during compilation. Conservative GC [73] checks its assump-
tions (e.g., that integers are not converted to heap pointers), and preserve original pointer values
around compiler optimizations of pointer arithmetic [98, 99]. However, these solutions can reject
legal C/C++ programs, as they essentially make pointer manipulations and casting illegal.
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GC Efficiency: Traditional mark-sweep collection [73] has been optimized using parallel marking
algorithms [100, 101], by collecting incrementally [102, 103], by treating generations of objects
separately [104, 105], or by organizing the heap into regions and performing mark-region GC
[106, 101]. The fragmentation problem when dealing with ambiguous pointers in uncooperative
environments like C has been addressed by mostly-copying collectors that move heap objects with
no direct references from the root set [107, 108, 105, 109, 110]. These optimizations are orthogonal
to our goal to realize sound GC for C, but they can be integrated into our GC.
GC Precision: Precise GC techniques disambiguate pointers from non-pointers to some degree,
relying on programmer annotations to register live pointers in a shadow stack to be managed by GC
libraries [111, 112, 113], or with cooperation from the compilers [114]. When compiling high-level
languages to C [115, 116, 117], a virtual machine with its own stack and registers convey necessary
type information to the GC, but this complicates code generation and makes systems fragile and
non-portable. As inefficiencies of conservative collection arise mostly due to their conservative
treatment of the root pointers [118], type-accurate GC [87] accurately locate pointers in a shadow
stack through extensive source transformations. Later systems [119, 120, 88] improve upon this by
optimizing metadata storage, and using static liveness analysis assuming the programs obey several
constraints. Such techniques are primarily motivated to solve the leakage and fragmentation issues
by enabling copying collection, although they incur significant additional framework overheads
[87, 88] and their reduced retention and compaction benefits are marginal [121]. But importantly,
these systems are more unsound than conservative GC in assuming that pointer values are only
stored into pointer types.
Reference Counting: In contrast to above reachability-based tracing collectors, Reference Count-
ing keeps count of incoming references to each object [122] and reclaims an object when its ref-
erence count falls to zero. This is natively supported in many languages like- Objective-C, Perl,
PHP, and Swift, and also in C++ via ‘smart pointers’. This requires the compiler to identify all
pointer updates and account reference counts which can become expensive; so it is deferred and
performed periodically and incrementally [102]. Reference counting is inefficient compared to pre-
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cise GC [84, 85], and moreover cannot collect cyclic garbage requiring separate cycle collectors
[123, 124] or forbidding cycles altogether [125]. Importantly, they inherently rely on type safety
and cannot handle pointer information flowing into non-pointers. Our dynamic pointer provenance
could be used to maintain reference counts to objects, and thereby realize a sound reference-count
based GC for C.
Taint and Provenance Analysis: There is a significant body of work on static and dynamic
information-flow analysis by tracking taints. They have been largely used to ensure that private
data do not leak through untrusted channels [16]. Static analysis [54] has also been used to reduce
the overhead of dynamic-taint tracking. Our COPA-based static analysis elides runtime monitors
by leveraging optimistic assumptions, and by taking advantage of special properties of the C lan-
guage standards that are beneficial in the context of dynamic pointer provenance. Also, unlike
classical taint solutions, we show how implicit-flow tracking is necessary and feasible to track in
our context.
Recent work has introduced static pointer provenance for C [71] in order to improve static
alias analysis. This static analysis was used by C compilers to improve compiler optimizations.
In contrast, we discuss dynamic pointer provenance, and optimistic hybrid analysis to optimize
it. Recent work used dynamic pointer provenance for implementing capability checks [126] to
improve security. In contrast, we use dynamic pointer provenance to construct sound GC for
weakly typed languages, and optimize that using optimistic hybrid analysis.
Memory Safety: Temporal memory safety ensures that programs access only allocated memory,
and Spatial memory safety ensure that all accesses are within allocated object bounds. Spatial MS
is ensured by dynamically checking that intermediate pointer arithmetic do not cross valid object
boundaries [127], and further tracking their intended objects for out-of-bounds pointers [128].
This approach has been improved by allocating memory in pools and storing object bounds more
efficiently [65], by restricting memory allocation sizes and layout to efficiently compute bounds
checks [129], eliminating redundant checks through static analysis [130, 7], and hybrid solutions
combining static analysis with hardware support [70]. Temporal MS requires tracking liveness of
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objects and checking for erroneous uses of uninitialized objects and dangling pointers (use-after-
free, double-free), which has also been heavily optimized using static analysis [6, 7, 62].
Another approach to MS, adopted by Cyclone [131], CCured [3], SafeCode [65], Checked C
[132], and Managed C++ [133], is to enforce constraints through a strong type system and then
perform sound analysis to check for memory errors, but the language becomes much restricted than
C, making porting programs hard. A contrasting approach is to combine heuristics, programmer
annotations, and unsound analyses in designing tools [134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139] that detect
most memory usage errors in practice.
Our sound GC guarantees temporal MS for legacy C/C++ code by automatically collecting safe
garbage that cannot be accessed later, and we show this can be done more efficiently.
Dynamic Type Inference: Types can be inferred from binaries during execution [140, 141], op-
tionally aided with static analysis [142], for many applications including- decompilation, binary
rewriting, vulnerability detection, memory forensics, etc. The typed binary can be executed with
dynamic type-safety checks [143]. Our dynamic tracking infers more than pointer types, as it also
tracks the pointer provenance when type-safety is violated.
Summary
Traditionally, Garbage Collectors have relied only on values to identify pointers in uncooperative
environments like C. C being weakly typed, this is unsound for several legal pointer manipulations.
We show that tracking pointer provenances using Dynamic Information Flow Tracking can soundly
identify all pointer information, even those hidden by their values, and a Provenance-based GC will
therefore safely collect only objects which cannot be accessed later.
To realize a practical Pointer Provenance Tracking solution, we leverage Optimistic Hybrid
Analysis, and identify properties that allow us to elide tracking for most common pointer oper-
ations. Our tool PROV-GC tracks pointer information propagations with only ∼ 16% overhead,
even via implicit control-flows, and also improves the overhead and effectiveness of collection.
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CHAPTER 5
OPT-SC: Efficient Sequential Consistency for Java
Modern concurrent languages such as C++/Java guarantee sequential consistency (SC) for data-
race-free programs. Data-races, however, are a common form of programmer error. For programs
with such data-races, their memory model guarantees are either undefined (C++) or too esoteric
for most programmers (Java).
A practically viable solution for guaranteeing language-level SC for all programs (SC-for-all),
even those with data-races, remains elusive. Current solutions are either too expensive, requires
custom SC hardware or imposes significant language-level restrictions.
We address this need for a low-cost SC-for-all solution by using a precise static data-race de-
tector, so that only a small set of potentially racy instructions need to be guarded by the costly
fence operations. Conventional sound static data-race detectors, however, are too imprecise and/or
do not scale to large programs. We address this problem using a new Cautiously Optimistic Pro-
gram Analysis (COPA) that induces a significantly more precise and scalable whole-program static
analysis by assuming likely program invariants. By checking likely invariants at runtime, and re-
covering when any of them fails, SC is guaranteed for all executions. We realize language-level
SC for Java on commodity x86 hardware at only ∼ 5% overhead for Spark.
5.1 Enforcing Strong Concurrency Semantics is Challenging
A memory consistency model defines the semantics of a concurrent programming language by
specifying the order in which one thread’s accesses to shared memory objects become visible to
other threads in the program. Sequential consistency (SC) [144] provides an intuitive memory
model by ensuring that the program’s instructions (appear to) execute in a global total order con-
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sistent with the per-thread program order. While programmers would benefit from such a simple
memory model with strong guarantees about the behavior of their programs, it can significantly
reduce the scope of compilers and the underlying hardware from performing optimizations. The
popular data-race-free-0 (DRF0) model [89] attempts to strike a balance between simplicity for
programmers and flexibility for compilers and hardware performance. In the DRF0 model, pro-
grammers explicitly annotate synchronized accesses (e.g. using volatile in Java and atomic
in C++) and the compiler and hardware limits in their optimizations to respect the semantics of
synchronized accesses declared by the programmer. The DRF0 model guarantees SC for correctly
synchronized programs that are free of data races, but leaves the semantics undefined for pro-
grams with data-races. The current memory model for C++ [145] is based on the DRF0 model and
its undefined semantics in the presence of data races complicates debugging tasks and reasoning
for program safety. The Java memory model [146] provides semantics for racy programs, but is
weaker than SC. However, this weaker semantics is too complex, and reasoning the correctness of
programs and various compiler and hardware optimizations remains challenging [147, 148].
The goal of our work is to make SC-for-all practical, i.e. all programs with or without data
races are guaranteed sequential consistency. Providing language-level SC semantics, however, re-
mains prohibitively expensive. In order to execute a given program under strict SC semantics, all
transformations or optimizations made by the compiler and the underlying hardware must preserve
the natural SC orderings of the source program. Existing SC-preserving compilers [149] ensure
the SC behavior of the source program is preserved by restricting certain compiler transforma-
tions while retaining much of the performance gains of the optimizing compiler. However, modern
commodity hardware (x86, ARM, PowerPC) that aggressively optimize memory accesses do not
guarantee SC behavior at runtime. So, systems requiring SC guarantees must additionally emit
expensive hardware fence operations around all shared-memory accesses to restrict hardware op-
timizations and re-orderings that can potentially violate SC. This naive approach is very expensive
and shared-memory concurrent programs thus perform poorly under the SC model on commodity
hardware.
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Providing SC semantics, however, does not require all shared-memory accesses to be guarded
via expensive fences. If shared memory accesses can be proven to be data-race-free statically,
then fences around such operations can be safely omitted. Since data-races are rare in production
software, a precise static data-race detector would be able to eliminate almost all the fences, thereby
resulting in near-zero overhead for SC.
However, a precise and scalable static data-race detection analysis remains elusive. Statically
proving memory accesses to be data-race-free is hard. Static race detection tools used in practice
often resort to unsound heuristics [150], do not reason about pointers altogether [151], or use
an imprecise context- and field-insensitive pointer analysis [152]. Recently proposed volatile-
by-default (VBD) semantics for Java [153] can provide SC, while allowing limited optimizations
using function-local static analyses and speculative compilation[154]. But, the cost of providing
SC remains quite high (24% on average and 64% maximum overhead for Spark).
In this work, we leverage Cautiously Optimistic Program Analysis (COPA) [1] to construct a
precise whole program static data-race-detector, which in turn allows us to realize, a practically
viable, low-overhead SC-for-all solution on commodity hardware.
COPA is a powerful technique that learns likely program invariants from profiled dynamic
behaviors, and then predicates the static analysis state space assuming such learned invariants
to induce a significantly more precise analysis. A COPA-induced static data-race detector is far
better at identifying non-racing shared-memory accesses than prior techniques. Our SC-compiler
optimistically compiles with fences only around memory accesses identified by this analysis as
potentially racy. The programs execute with additional lightweight runtime checks that validate
the assumed invariants. In the rare event that an invariant fails during a dynamic execution, we
leverage the JVM’s just-in-time compilation features to soundly recover the execution to a program
version that is conservatively optimized without the likely invariants.
Our work presents the first low-overhead SC-for-all solution for Java on commodity hardware,
that works for legacy programs without incurring language restrictions or requiring programmer
annotations, using a significantly precise static data-race detection analysis. Our optimistic static
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data-race analysis eliminates about 85% of false data-races compared to conventional static data-
race analysis. Our SC-compiler can then elide fences for these accesses, irrespective of underlying
hardware’s memory model (x86 or ARM). This allows us to realize SC-for-all for Java on x86 for
just 5% overhead on average and 13% maximum overhead for Spark.
5.2 Memory Consistency Models
Our goal is to provide SC for all programs at the language-level on commodity hardware. This
section presents the necessary background on the challenges with current memory models and in
providing language-level SC for all programs.
5.2.1 Data-Race-Free Memory Model and Its Limitations
A memory consistency model, or simply memory model, defines the semantics of a concurrent
programming language by specifying the order in which one thread’s accesses to shared mem-
ory objects become visible to other threads in the program. A data-race-free (DRF) memory
model requires programmers to explicitly annotate synchronization variables that can race (us-
ing volatile in Java, atomic in C++). There exists a data-race between any two data accesses
to a memory location, if they are from different threads, at least one of them is a write, and if they
are unordered by synchronization accesses.
For data-race-free programs, DRF languages provide sequential consistency (SC). Sequential
consistency (SC) [144] guarantees that a program’s instructions (appear to) execute in a global
total order consistent with the per-thread program order. This intuitive memory model is easily
understood and has well known benefits [89].
DRF, however, treats programs with data races in one of two ways– (Strict) treats data races as
errors leading to undefined behavior (C++[145, 155]), or (Weak) defines feasible program execu-
tion semantics, but they are too complex for programmers to reason about (Java[146]).
While it is naturally desirable to write data-race-free programs, many programs unfortunately
81
contain data-races, sometimes rather intentionally [156] and they are present across a wide range of
Java applications [153]. It is challenging for programmers to reason about these program behaviors
in the presence of data-races and debug them. Java’s semantics for data races are so complex that
even building correct compilers can be challenging [147, 148, 157].
5.2.2 Sequential Consistency For All
SC is easily understood and has well known benefits [89]. It is therefore desirable to guarantee SC
semantics at the language-level for all programs, even those with data-races.
However, in spite of its well understood benefits, SC is not supported in practice, due to its
prohibitively high performance overhead. To preserve SC at the language-level, we must ensure
that the observable ordering of memory accesses is preserved both at the compiler level and at the
hardware level. Prior work has constructed a SC-preserving compiler [149] that ensures the SC
behavior of the source program while retaining much of the performance gains of the optimizing
compiler (less than 2% overhead).
However, efficiently guaranteeing SC at the hardware level remains challenging since com-
modity hardware (x86, ARM) perform several memory reordering optimizations that violate SC.
To guarantee SC behavior on such modern commodity hardware, the compilers, in addition to be-
ing SC-preserving, need to insert expensive memory ordering operations, most commonly in the
form of fence operations, to restrict the hardware from reordering shared-memory accesses around
them. This severely restricts hardware optimizations, leading to high performance overhead.
Not all shared-memory accesses, however, need to be guarded by expensive fence operations.
If a memory access can be statically proven to be data-race-free by the compiler, the compiler can
safely elide the unnecessary fence for that access. Fewer the fences, lower the SC overhead.
Proving data-race-freedom statically is, however, challenging. The only prior work that comes
close to eliminating a vast majority of fences using advanced concurrency analysis require signif-
icant language restrictions on a dialect of Java [158]. These techniques do not translate to current
C++ and Java language standards, and therefore practical SC for all programs remains a challenge.
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Volatile-by-default (VBD) semantics
VBD is a recent solution [153] that treats all shared variables as volatile unless explicitly
marked as otherwise (data-race-free) by the programmer. VBD guarantees SC for programs with
correct annotations of data-race-free accesses. Memory accesses that are incorrectly annotated
would have weaker guarantees as data-races in Java.
VBD also conservatively provides SC for programs with no annotations. It uses function-local
static analysis to conservatively prove a subset of thread-local accesses to be data-race-free. Recent
work [154] improved this solution by speculatively assuming all accesses are thread-local, and then
dynamically recompiling the program as shared memory accesses are discovered. The resulting
system is currently the state-of-the-art SC-for-all solution (assuming no annotation). Its overhead
for x86 hardware is still too prohibitive for practical adoption: ∼ 24% on average, and maximum
65% for Spark.
5.2.3 SC-for-all Using Precise Datarace Detection
In most correct programs, a large fraction of accesses to shared-memory locations are in fact data-
race-free. A precise data-race detection analysis can identify memory accesses that can potentially
be racy and the SC-compiler can then selectively apply fences only around such operations.
A scalable and precise sound static data-race detection analysis, which in turn relies on sound
memory alias analysis, is challenging as it must reason about all possible executions. Static data-
race detection tools used in practice therefore often resort to heuristics [150], do not reason about
pointers altogether [151], or use a weaker context- and field-insensitive pointer analysis [152].
Next, we describe how our Optimistic Hybrid Analysis approach solves these fundamental limita-
tions of traditional sound static data-race analyses to realize SC at a low-overhead.
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5.3 Precise Predicated Static Datarace Detection
Conventional sound static data-race detectors are imprecise and/or not scalable to large programs.
They report a large number of potential data-races, which we refer to as may-race accesses, most
of which are actually data-race-free in practice. Since all may-race accesses need to be guarded
with fence, lower the precision, higher the overhead for SC.
We use predicated static data-race analysis [1], which allows us to classify a large fraction
of may-race accesses into likely-race-free memory accesses. This is achieved by restricting the
program states analyzed by an otherwise sound static analysis to a set wherein likely invariants
hold. These likely invariants are properties that are likely to remain true for almost all executions,
but are hard to prove. They can be learnt through profiling representative program executions. The
predicated static analysis guarantees that the likely-race-free accesses are race-free for program
executions, as long as the likely invariants hold true.
In the next section §5.4, we discuss our COPA-SC compiler that optimistically elides fences
for these likely-race-free accesses in addition to the provably race-free accesses determined by a
conservative static analysis. A program execution, however, can violate a likely invariant. There-
fore, a key challenge is in safely recovering and guaranteeing SC, even in the presence of likely
invariant violations. Our OPT-SC solution, discussed later in §5.4, addresses this key problem.
In this section, we first present an overview of traditional static data-race analyses and motivate
the challenges. Then we present the design of our significantly more precise predicated static
data-race analysis.
5.3.1 Conventional Conservative Data-race Analysis
A static data-race detector computes the pairs of program instructions that may lead to data-races
in an execution. Typically, a static race detector works in two phases:
May-Happen-in-Parallel (MHP) analysis [159] statically determines whether two instruc-
tions (or two instances of the same instruction) in a program may execute in parallel or not. The
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MHP analysis uses a whole-program context-insensitive flow-sensitive analysis to compute the set
of all load and store instructions that can dynamically happen in parallel [160, 161]. A whole-
program context-insensitive pointer-alias analysis is then performed to identify pointers in the pro-
gram that may be used to access the same memory locations. The MHP analyses then combines
this information to further identify those instruction pairs that may concurrently read and write to
the same memory location. These determine the set of all potentially racy memory accesses.
Lockset-based pruning then excludes potentially racy instruction pairs from the above set that
are correctly synchronized. It uses the pointer analysis information to compute the lockset for each
memory access, i.e. the set of lock variables that alias with the lock that guards the memory access.
It then excludes those pairs of racy memory accesses that are guarded by the same locks.
Challenges
Statically proving memory accesses to be data-race-free remains intractable in practice. The MHP
analysis and underlying pointer analysis use whole-program data-flow analyses that are funda-
mentally imprecise and unscalable for reasonably large concurrent programs, because they must
be overly conservative to be sound in the presence of dynamic features such as dynamic class
loading, class redefinitions, etc. Moreover during the lockset-based pruning phase, the weaker
may-alias relations cannot be effectively used to prune racy instructions guarded by a common
lock which requires a stronger must-alias reasoning [160]. So, they are unable to prove many
memory accesses as data-race-free. Using call- and object-sensitive analysis instead can improve
precision [161], but such analyses do not scale for large programs as distinguishing the contexts
leads to the state-space explosion problem. Traditional static data-race analyses either do not scale
to large programs, or are too imprecise. Consequently as seen in Fig. 5.1, traditional static race
detectors can identify only a small set of provably race-free accesses and conservatively treat that
majority of accesses may-race, leaving behind fences for a large number of memory accesses that











Figure 5.1: Benefits of predicated over conservative data-race analysis: While conservative anal-
ysis can identify only few race-free accesses thus emitting fences for the remaining majority of
may-race accesses, predicated analysis can additionally identify a large number of likely-race-free
accesses and then speculatively elide fences around them.
5.3.2 Precise Predicated Data-race Analysis
In order to tackle the fundamental problem of imprecision of static analyses, predicated static
analysis [1] uses likely program invariants to predicate the static analysis to induce a significantly
more precise reasoning as follows.
Likely Guarding Locks invariants dynamically identify the set of objects locked at each lock
site and infers a must-hold-same-lock relation for pairs of lock sites that always only lock the same
object. These relations inferred from the invariants enable the lockset-based pruning phase of the
datarace detection to exclude many pairs of correctly synchronized memory accesses that are oth-
erwise treated as potentially racy. In a conservative analysis without this dynamic information,
the lockset-based pruning phase cannot remove many racy pairs since it cannot derive the required
must-hold-same-lock relations from the weaker may-alias relations of a conventional pointer anal-
ysis.
Likely Singleton Thread invariants identify thread creation sites that only ever create a single
instance of a thread. These singleton-thread instances greatly benefit the MHP analysis, since by
assuming this behavior, the MHP analysis can reason that all memory accesses within the singleton
thread are ordered thus allowing it to prune memory access pairs for singleton threads.
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1 class Data { int data = 0; }
2 class Clazz extends Thread {
3 static Data global = new Data();
4 public void run() {
5 Data local = new Data();
6 try {
7 helper(local);
8 } catch (Exception e) {




13 static void helper(Data arg) {
14 arg.data++; // add fence
15 }
16 }
(a) Conservative Static Analysis
1 class Data { int data = 0; }
2 class Clazz extends Thread {
3 static Data global = new Data();
4 public void run() {
5 Data local = new Data();
6 try {
7 helper(local);
8 } catch (Exception e) {
9 copa_check_recover();
10 helper(global); // likely unreachable
11 }
12 }
13 static void helper(Data arg) {
14 arg.data++; // elide fence
15 }
16 }
(b) Predicated Static Analysis
Figure 5.2: Example Java program benefiting from predicated data-race analysis: (5.2a) Conserva-
tive analysis must add fence on line 14 for the rare case when global is passed to the helper()
function on line 10. (5.2b) Optimistic analysis elides the fence on line 14 assuming the exception
handler on line 10 is never called, and adds copa_check_recover() just before line 10 to detect
and recover when this assumption is violated.
Example of COPA enhanced static data-race analysis
Consider the example program in Fig. 5.2a: multiple running threads operate on their thread-local
data by passing local to the helper() function on line 7 during the normal execution, and only
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operate on the shared data global on line 10 during an exception. The conservative sound anal-
ysis reasons that since on line 14, arg may indeed update the shared global data, it may race in
some execution, and must be guarded by a fence. As a result, line 14 is always dynamically pro-
tected by the expensive fence even though it operates on the local data during normal execution,
unnecessarily slowing down the execution. On the other hand, COPA in Fig. 5.2b is able to infer
that line 10 is likely unreachable code just by observing few dynamic executions. Assuming this
invariant, the predicated analysis reasons that since at line 14, only the local data reaches the
update, it cannot race and need not be guarded by the fence. This reasoning holds for all correct
executions of the program. However, during an exceptional execution on line 9, COPA is able to
first detect and recover the execution before helper() is actually called with the global data.
5.4 COPA for Efficient Sequential Consistency
OPT-SC uses Cautiously Optimistic Program Analysis (COPA) to guarantee SC-for-all. As we
discussed so far, our offline predicated static data-race detector can identify many more likely-race-
free memory accesses in addition to those proven race-free using conservative analysis. Next, our
OPT-SC compiler optimistically elides fences for these likely-race-free accesses and only emits
fences for the remaining few may-race accesses. During most program executions when the as-
sumed likely invariants hold, then the likely-race-free accesses are guaranteed to be data-race-free
for that execution, and so it entails an SC execution. If these invariants fail, OPT-SC will safely
add additional fences to guarantee SC. This speculative optimization allows OPT-SC to provide
language-level sequential consistency for Java at only ∼ 5% overhead on commodity x86 hard-
ware.
Fig. 5.3 illustrates the complete workflow of our system. In §5.3.2, we already covered how we
identified strong invariants through profiling to induce a more precise predicated data-race analysis.
In the remainder of the section, we elaborate on how OPT-SC uses the precise predicated data-race
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Figure 5.3: Workflow of OPT-SC
cost. The OPT-SC compiler enforces SC behavior by adding required fences, and the runtime
system detects and recovers the execution to soundly provide SC in the rare event of a likely
invariant violation.
5.4.1 OPT-SC Soundness For SC Guarantees
The key to the soundness of our system is guaranteeing that the program is data-race free. That
is, we require an ordering fence operation between two accesses to the same memory location by
different threads if at least one access is a write. If our system can guarantee a fence is placed
between all such memory accesses, it guarantees memory access ordering, and the DRF0 system
that it is built on top of will provide sequential consistency.
Most systems which use this model to provide SC-for-all simply elide fences around operations
they can prove are data-race free. This trivially results in a well ordered operation, as any non-
provably racy operation has a fence. However, OPT-SC removes fences speculatively, depending
on the observed execution states. Consequently, for some executions one set of fences is sufficient,
and for others another set may be required. We now discuss how OPT-SC guarantees orderings in
all executions.
Trivially, predicated analysis promises that race-free memory accesses and likely-race-free ac-
cesses cannot cause races in executions for which likely invariants hold. OPT-SC can safely elide
their fences for these execution.
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When a likely invariant fails, OPT-SC recovers by transitioning the execution to a conserva-
tively optimized program, by re-inserting fences at any likely-race-free memory access that were
previously elided. Once these fences are added, all memory operations will be totally ordered
under all conditions, guaranteeing safety. However, this transition must be handled with care to
ensure data race freedom.
In summary, OPT-SC ensures correct SC behavior under all executions as follows:
• Predicated Analysis identifies likely invariants to prove many more memory accesses to be
likely-race-free, and then speculatively elides fences around such memory accesses. The result-
ing execution is guaranteed to be SC when the assumed invariants hold.
• If an invariant ever fails, all accesses before the invariant failure are strictly ordered with all
accesses after the invariant failure as follows:
• Eager Invariant Checks detect an execution outside of those analyzed in the predicated anal-
ysis just before an invariant is actually violated.
• Ordered Transition ensures that memory accesses from before the transition are strictly or-
dered before those from the conservatively recovered execution. This is achieved by inserting
a dynamic barrier at the invariant check failure path and waiting for all threads to pause at
SafePoints.
• Recovery then switches the program to a version that conservatively re-inserts the elided
fences, thereafter ensuring correct SC behavior.
5.4.2 OPT-SC Compiler
OPT-SC’s design is based on the guarantees already provided by a language with the popular DRF0
memory model [89]. Additionally, we rely on some modern language features– particularly, we use
dynamic de-optimization provided by Just-in-time compiled languages for constructing the COPA
recovery, and use the notion of SafePoints in managed garbage-collected languages to reason for
its correctness. We present OPT-SC’s design for the Java language, although our system can be
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extended for other managed languages like C#, Ruby, etc., however, our system’s overheads and
overall benefits may vary.
Once our predicated static data-race detection analysis has determined the set of memory ac-
cesses that can potentially race, our modified SC-compiler must satisfy two requirements–
First, it must insert fence operations only around the remaining may-race accesses, and spec-
ulatively elide fences for the likely-race-free accesses. To this end, we adapt the existing Java
JIT compiler framework to identify the potentially racy instructions and selectively only emit the
platform-specific hardware fence operations, as we describe later in §5.5.
Secondly, the compiler must respect the additionally imposed ordering constraints throughout
all optimization passes. During the JVM compilation phase, Java bytecode is translated to a graph-
based intermediate representation called the Ideal Graph. We modify the Ideal graph construction
phase to create special memory-barrier nodes around the statically determined set of may-race
memory accesses. All downstream compiler optimizations respect the semantics of the memory-
barrier nodes and do not reorder memory accesses around them, thus ensuring SC at the compiler
level.
5.4.3 Runtime Invariant Checks
Although the static datarace detection analysis elides fences assuming likely program invariants,
this reasoning holds for the vast majority of dynamic executions that do not violate the assumed
invariants. The invariants may, however, be invalidated in a rare execution. A key advantage
of COPA is that even though an invariant violation renders the predicated static analysis to be
unsound, the soundness of the final dynamic execution can still be recovered as long as the invariant
violation is detected immediately and the dynamic execution is then recovered. So, the OPT-SC
compiler additionally inserts checks that validate the likely invariants at runtime to ensure that the
dynamic execution is within the set of executions that were statically analyzed in the predicated
static analysis.
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Our COPA invariants satisfy the property in O2 as they are simple enough to be checked dy-
namically at a very low cost: violations of likely unreachable code blocks are discovered as soon as
the code block is visited; validating likely guarding locks require the aliasing lock-sites to perform
a quick check that they lock the same dynamic object; likely singleton thread creation sites require
an inexpensive check on the number of spawned threads.
The other key property of our invariants as stated in O4 is that– the invariant checks detect
before the invariants are violated. This is critical to guarantee the soundness of our system upon
recovery. All of our invariant checks satisfy this property by construction. A violation of likely
unreachable code invariant is detected immediately upon entering the code block and before the
code block is actually executed. A dynamic check for aliasing locks detects violations of likely
guarding locks invariant before the locks are actually acquired. A simple check on the dynamic
number of spawning threads at thread creation sites detects a violation of likely singleton thread
invariant before the threads are actually invoked. Consequently, when a likely invariant violation
is detected during execution, the dynamic program state is one where the violation is just about to
occur. So, we detect invariant violations immediately before they take affect.
5.4.4 Recovering SC Upon Likely Invariant Violation
When an invariant fails during a rare execution scenario, it implies that the dynamic execution
is about to exit from the set of states for which the predicated static analysis holds sound. Note
that the execution state so far is one that satisfies the COPA predicates, and so adheres to SC
even using the optimistic reasoning. However, future execution may violate SC as the predicated
reasoning is no longer guaranteed to be correct. To ensure sound SC behavior, it is therefore
necessary that the execution be recovered to a version that ensures SC by conservatively guarding
memory accesses with fences without assuming the COPA invariants. Furthermore, it is essential
that the SC orderings are adhered during the recovery process itself when the program threads are
switching to the conservative version. We elaborate below how the recovery process satisfies this
safety requirement in O5.
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We introduce a dynamic barrier during the program recovery to ensure SC behavior while
the program threads are undergoing the recovery to their conservative versions. Unlike a regu-
lar barrier which always enforces program threads to be synchronized and prevents operations
from being reordered across, the dynamic barrier provides this synchronization semantic only on-
demand when invoked by the OPT-SC recovery. This dynamic barrier effectively prevents memory
accesses from being reordered by the compiler in the instance of an invariant violation. First, the
offending thread that detects the invariant violation invokes a special recovery function that waits
until all other threads are paused at SafePoints. Managed languages provide the notion of a VM
SafePoint [162] where the state of the VM is well-defined so that threads can be safely paused and
resumed. We extend the SafePoints construct to additionally require that invariant check violations
are also SafePoints. This ensures the offending thread can be stopped safely and immediately.
Additionally, all other running threads are paused at their nearest SafePoints; loop back-edges also
being SafePoints [163], all threads pause quickly.
The recovery process is safe and preserves SC due to two reasons – Firstly, compilers pre-
vent several unsafe optimizations including memory reordering across such SafePoints in order
to preserve program semantics in the presence of dynamic language features such as code de-
optimization, instrumentation, etc. And secondly, since the offending thread is paused and the
invariant has not yet been violated, the existing fences instrumented using the COPA-induced pred-
icated reasoning suffice to enforce the required SC orderings during the recovery itself. Moreover,
the recovery process is deadlock-free, since any wait operation is also a SafePoint.
Once all threads are safely paused, the program needs to re-insert all optimistically elided
fences. This can be achieved using a static compilation technique that maintains two separate code
versions [36]. However for efficient recovery, we leverage the just-in-time compilation framework
to iteratively invalidate all previously cached compiled code. All subsequent code invocations
compile using a conservative approach for SC behavior that inserts fences around all shared mem-
ory accesses. This is a one-time recovery, and we do not switch back to the program version with
optimistically inserted fences.
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In summary, OPT-SC ensures SC behavior throughout program executions in all cases. When
invariants hold, the fences induced using its precise predicated data-race analysis suffice to ensure
SC. When an invariant rarely fails, it is detected before the invariant violation has taken effect,
so that all threads can be safely paused and recovered to a version that ensures SC behavior by
conservatively inserting fences.
5.4.5 Likely Invariant Violations Are Rare
Naturally, there is a strong dependency between the quality of profiling and the rate of invariant
violations. Poor profiling would induce unstable invariants that fail often and thus would invalidate
the benefits of COPA. In practice, our invariants meet the stability property in O3 and are violated
extremely rarely.
We leverage the extensive test suites that often ship with mature production software systems
for the purpose of profiling for COPA invariants. These test suites are carefully designed to exer-
cise a wide range of program behaviors, including representative common-case inputs as well as
possible erroneous and anomalous behaviors. As such, violations of COPA invariants inferred on
such test suites would indicate weaknesses in the software testing methodology and would make
the case for improving these test suites. Failed invariants can even provide useful hints for gener-
ating better test cases. Profiling on existing test suites is thus adequate, and invariant failures are
quite rare in practice.
One resulting design choice was not to recover the execution upon invariant failure to a conser-
vatively optimized version as in prior COPA works [36], i.e. a program version with fences added
to those potentially racy instructions as determined using a traditional sound data-race analysis
without assuming the COPA invariants. Instead, we recover by switching to the volatile-by-
default semantics [153] which conservatively guards all shared memory accesses with necessary
fences, and further reduce the runtime costs associated with this recovery by leveraging the just-
in-time compilation features of the modern JVM, which we further elaborate later in §5.5. This
design choice not only simplifies the implementation, but is further justified as the large analysis
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time spent in a conservative static analysis does not yield significant performance advantage com-
pared to the conservative VBD version in our experience. Moreover, since invariant failures are
rare in practice, we do not further optimize the associated cost of COPA recovery.
5.5 OPT-SC Implementation
In this section, we discuss the implementation of OPT-SC which primarily consists of two com-
ponents: (1) the COPA static data-race analysis framework, and (2) the SC-compiler within the
JVM. Our COPA analysis is implemented in the Chord analysis framework [160, 161], and the
SC-compiler modifies Oracle’s HotSpot JVM [164] to instrument and preserve necessary fences
as well as perform COPA recovery if needed. Our SC-compiler is closely based on the VBD-
HotSpot [153] that introduces the volatile-by-default semantics for Java, and we later compare
against this VBD-HotSpot baseline in our evaluation.
5.5.1 Static Data-race Analysis
The target Java program is first compiled using the OpenJDK javac compiler and the resulting
Java bytecode is used for analyses in Chord, which further uses the Joeq compiler [165] to convert
the bytecode into a suitable intermediate representation for ease of analysis.
Profiling Likely Invariants The first step of COPA gathers likely invariants by observing pro-
filing executions of the program. Here we use Chord’s bytecode manipulation framework to log
the necessary dynamic information for inferring our invariants in §5.3.2 by instrumenting profiling
code into the original program at relevant program locations such as basic block entries, lock sites
and thread creation sites. The instrumented program is then run on a set of profiling inputs and
the dynamic information is recorded. In addition to profiling COPA invariants, the dynamic infor-
mation collected from these executions are also used for Reflection Resolution [166]. We use this
dynamic reflection resolution in subsequent analyses, as we find Chord’s internal static reflection
analysis to be unsound.
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Predicated Data-race Analysis Chord facilitates easy extension of existing and new analyses
via an interface that describes analysis operations using a declarative logic-programming language
called Datalog. The datalog analyses represent various program domains, e.g. the set of all fields in
the program, and each analysis induces relations among multiple program domains. For example,
a typical pointer analysis computes a relation on the tuple of program variables or fields to heap
memory locations. An analysis specifies rules that conditionally apply on a set of input relations
to compute the output relations. Chord then iteratively applies these rules to compute the analyses
relations using an efficient BDD representation-based solver.
Our predicated data-race analysis extends the default context-insensitive lockset-based data-
race detector in Chord [160] as follows. First, the profiled dynamic information is imported as
relations to infer the COPA likely invariants discussed in §5.3.2. Then Chord’s context-insensitive
pointer analysis is predicated to assume the COPA likely unused code invariants, thereby making it
much more precise. The MHP analysis is then enhanced to use the precise pointer analysis results
and additionally exclude false race pairs by assuming the likely singleton thread invariants. The
datarace analysis then assumes the likely guarding lock invariants to deduce must-aliasing lock-
sets relations that remove well-synchronized memory accesses. The resulting COPA-optimized
data-race detection analysis produces a significantly more precise list of potentially racy memory
accesses. The list of such memory accesses are then passed to our SC-compiler which emits the
necessary fences around them to enforce SC behavior at runtime.
Likely Invariant Checks Since COPA assumes likely invariants to induce a more precise static
analysis, these assumptions must be validated at runtime. So, we use the ASM bytecode manipula-
tion framework [167] to instrument checks that dynamically validate our likely invariant assump-
tions. Since the bytecode is modified here, we adjust the bytecode index (BCI) accordingly in the
static analysis results that are used to convey potentially racy instructions to the SC-compiler. The
predicated static analysis is sound as long as the invariant checks hold and guarantees SC behavior.
When an invariant rarely fails, the execution is recovered to a conservative SC approach as we
describe later.
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5.5.2 OPT-SC JVM Compiler
Our SC-compiler modifies the Oracle HotSpot JVM in two ways to ensure the program’s SC be-
havior at runtime.
Instrumenting Fences Although OPT-SC operates at the Java bytecode level, the widely used
OpenJDK javac compiler [164] that compiles Java source code to bytecode performs no op-
timizations that effectively reorder memory accesses [153]. So, compiling a Java program with
javac and then executing with OPT-SC provides SC semantics for the source program at the Java
language level.
The Java Virtual Machine typically executes new code in the interpreted mode. The interpreter
executing one operation at a time naturally preserves SC at the compiler level, and we instrument
fences to further ensure that the underlying hardware respects SC semantics. Moreover, bytecode-
rewriting optimizations performed by the JVM interpreter never reorder memory accesses, and
Java intrinsic functions never write to shared memory [153], thus ensuring SC.
Once the JVM identifies a ‘hot spot’ in the code, it is compiled to native code. During this com-
pilation phase, we modify the JVM c2 (server) compiler to load the results of our static analysis
and identify all potentially racy instructions. The compiler then adds the special memory-barrier
nodes around them after constructing the Ideal Graph representation. This prevents subsequent op-
timizations from reordering memory accesses across the memory-barrier nodes. The code genera-
tion then emits the platform-specific hardware fence instructions to enforce the necessary ordering
constraints during the actual execution. Enforcing this on the x86 total store order (TSO) seman-
tics [168] requires no additional fences for load operations and requires a StoreLoad barrier after
store operations that may potentially race to ensure that the store commits before any subsequent
loads [169]. For simplicity, we only modify the c2 server compiler and invoke the JVM with the
-XX:-TieredCompilation flag to disable tiered compilation and skip the c1 client compiler.
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Recovery Using JVM De-optimization In rare execution scenarios, a COPA invariant may be
violated, requiring that the execution be recovered to a conservative version adding back the fences
that were removed using the optimistic reasoning. The recovery process mainly provides two
functions– (1) it implements the dynamic barrier discussed in §5.4.4 that ensures ordering re-
quirements are maintained during the recovery itself, and (2) it implements the mechanism that
re-inserts the fences conservatively into the program.
The dynamic barrier implementation leverages the semantics of JVM’s SafePoints [163]. Func-
tion call boundaries being SafePoints, the invocation of our recovery function acts as a barrier that
the compiler cannot reorder memory accesses around in order to preserve the SafePoint state. The
recovery mechanism is implemented as a “VM operation” which causes all running threads to be
paused at JVM SafePoints before proceeding with the recovery.
Next, we switch the program version to one with conservatively inserted fences. As discussed
earlier in §5.4.5, we choose to recover by switching to the volatile-by-default semantics [153].
To do so, we leverage the HotSpot JVM’s existing de-optimization mechanism [170, §6.2]. Since
we use a whole-program static analysis, the scope of our COPA optimizations is not limited, and
consequently we must recover by switching the entire program to the conservative VBD seman-
tics, which simplifies the recovery. The JVM de-optimization mechanism is invoked iteratively for
each remaining class, which invalidates the compiled code cache. A global flag is set to indicate
the switch to conservative mode. And all subsequent invocations as well as newly loaded classes
compile conservatively with the VBD semantics. Once the de-optimization is complete, execu-
tion can resume safely since the program semantics remains unchanged and the JVM safepoints
preserve the mapping from the bytecode level to the JVM execution state.
5.6 Evaluation
In this section, we show that OPT-SC can significantly reduce the performance cost of providing
SC for a wide range of Java server applications. We measure the performance overheads of OPT-
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SC over the unmodified JVM on several benchmark applications. Then we compare its overheads
to that of VBD-Hotspot [153], a JVM compiler that enforces the volatile-by-default semantics,
and S-VBD-HotSpot [154] that additionally improves this cost using speculative compilation. Our
evaluation shows that-
• OPT-SC provides SC to a wide range of Java applications at only marginal overheads- avg. 9%
and 5% for Dacapo benchmarks and Spark applications respectively compared to 31% and 28%
respectively with VBD.
• The performance benefits of OPT-SC stem from the significantly more precise static datarace
analysis using Optimistic Hybrid Analysis, which removes guarding fences from 84% more
memory accesses compared to a conservative datarace analysis.
• The benefits of Optimistic Hybrid Analysis are realized with a reasonable effort in profiling, and
the application performance does not suffer from invariant violations.
All experiments are run on 8 cores of an Intel Xeon E5-2620 v4 processor with hyper-threading,
which provides total 16 processing units, sharing 64GB RAM and running Linux 4.18.
5.6.1 Runtime Overheads of Providing SC
Dacapo Benchmarks
We first evaluate the effectiveness of OPT-SC on the Dacapo [171] benchmark suite, a set of open-
source Java applications from a wide range of application domains that is widely used to evaluate
Java performance. We run our experiments on multi-threaded applications from the benchmarks
suite which are compatible with the underlying Chord [160] static analysis framework.
The Optimistic hybrid analysis [1] requires a profiling phase to learn invariants. To this end,
we construct a corpus of profiling and test sets, each consisting 64 inputs for each benchmark, by
using the following large input sets:
• sunflow – curated inputs by sweeping the parameter space (e.g. input size, number of threads,
pseudo-random seed).
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• lusearch – Search novels from Project Gutenberg[172].
• pmd – Run the pmd source code analysis tool across source files in our benchmarks.
• luindex – Index novels from Project Gutenberg[172].
• xalan – Convert xhtml versions of pydoc 2.7 Webpages to XSL-FO files.
We run OPT-SC as a programmer would typically on a large set of regression tests. We first
increasingly profile more executions, until the number of learned program invariants stabilizes.
The static analysis is then predicated to assume the learned invariants from the profiling phase.
The performance evaluations then run the default workload for each benchmark along with all
inputs in our testing set. We run 10 JVM invocations for each benchmark and report the average
of the 10 invocations. Upon each JVM invocation, we first run each benchmark for 5 warm-up
iterations, and calculate the average runtime for the next 5 iterations.
Note that our implementation, as well as the VBD-HotSpot that we compare against, adapts
only the JVM server compiler. Consequently, we disable JVM’s tiered compilation feature (using
-XX:-TieredCompilation flag), and all experiments use this configuration. The runtime
overhead numbers are normalized to that of the unmodified JVM also disabling tiered compilation.
Fig. 5.4a presents the relative execution times normalized over that using the baseline unmodi-
fied HotSpot JVM. For each benchmark program, the group of bars in left-to-right order represents
the overhead of the naive VBD compiler [153], the improved VBD compiler using speculative
compilation optimization [154], and our OPT-SC. The naive VBD compiler incurs an average 31%
overhead and upto a maximum of 78% overhead. The speculative compilation technique only
brings this overhead to an average 21% and still upto 42% overhead. OPT-SC significantly reduces
the overhead of enforcing SC to only 9% on average. Excluding the luindex benchmark for
which OPT-SC incurs a slowdown of 31%, the average overhead is only ∼ 4%. We suspect this
program sees limited benefits due to its frequent array accesses which present to be challenging
to our static analysis. Furthermore, we observe that while S-VBD’s speculative compilation only
marginally benefits all benchmarks (∼ 1.4× speedup over VBD), OPT-SC’s benefits are signifi-
cantly higher (∼ 4.4× speedup over VBD).
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Spark Benchmarks
Next, we evaluate OPT-SC on Apache Spark [173], a widely used framework for big-data analytics
and machine-learning tasks. Note that Spark is written in the Scala language but it compiles to the
Java bytecode. So, our analysis can also be applied to such systems to extend SC guarantees.
We run OPT-SC on the spark-tests benchmarks provided by Databricks representing several
big-data analytics applications. We run Spark in standalone mode on a single machine, i.e. the
driver and executors all run locally as separate processes communicating through specific ports.
The spark-perf benchmarking framework runs a benchmark multiple times and reports the median
execution time. We run spark-perf framework for 10 invocations and report the average of the
median execution times.
Fig. 5.4b presents the relative execution times for the spark-tests benchmarks normalized
over that with the baseline HotSpot JVM disabling tiered compilation using three JVM configurations-
VBD, S-VBD, and OPT-SC respectively from left-to-right. Once again, OPT-SC significantly im-
proves upon VBD and S-VBD bringing down the runtime overheads from an average 28% with
VBD down to only 5%.
Interestingly, when comparing S-VBD over naive VBD, we note that the performance benefits
of S-VBD are much less pronounced for the long-running Spark benchmarks (∼ 1.2× speedup
over VBD), while OPT-SC still yields significant performance (∼ 5× speedup over VBD). S-VBD
is ineffective since its speculation at the class level only pays off initially and quickly diminishes
for large parts of multi-threaded programs over the course of the execution. On the other hand,
OPT-SC’s fine-grained invariants rarely fail and the programs enjoy the benefits of COPA during
steady-state execution.
5.6.2 Precision of Static Data-race Detection
Next, to understand the sources of COPA’s efficiency, we investigate how COPA’s predicated anal-
yses assuming the likely invariants affect the precision of results throughout the various phases of


































































































































































































Figure 5.4: Result: OPT-SC reduces execution time overhead compared to VBD and S-VBD
size of the analyses result sets for the underlying pointer and MHP analyses, and the final num-
ber of potential races for each benchmark program using two configurations– the baseline Cons
version uses the conservative analyses, and the COPA version predicates each analyses using the
102
Table 5.1: COPA improved precision of intermediate static analyses and data-race detection
Benchmark
Static Analysis Pointer Analysis MHP Analysis Datarace Analysis
Time #pointer aliasing pairs #unordered instruction pairs #racy instructions
Cons COPA Cons COPA Cons COPA Cons COPA
sunflow 3m 01s 4m 07s 47.2K 3.9K 91.6% 43.1M 140.3K 99.7% 15,440 1,589 89.7%
lusearch 1m 19s 1m 57s 26.8K 3.0K 88.8% 9.1M 56.1K 99.4% 8,369 867 89.6%
pmd 1m 08s 2m 24s 31.3K 7.2K 76.8% 7.5M 116.2K 98.4% 10,309 2,142 79.2%
luindex 1m 12s 2m 03s 26.9K 4.8K 82.3% 9.1M 1.0M 88.8% 9,029 3,189 64.7%
xalan 1m 02s 1m 30s 23.9K 3.5K 85.3% 8.8M 28.8K 99.7% 7,023 68 99.0%
Apache Spark 3m 49s 3m 13s 42.1K 2.9K 92.9% 65.0M 118.2K 99.8% 9,098 1,162 87.2%
GeoMean 86.1% 97.6% 84.2%
COPA invariant assumptions. The right columns (highlighted in blue) for the three results is a
measure of COPA’s precision over conservative analyses indicating the percentage reduction in the
analysis result sets. We see that COPA’s predicated analyses significantly improves the precision
at each stage of the static data-race detection: by an average 86% for the pointer analysis, by 98%
for the MHP analysis, and by 84% for the number of identified races. This explains the reason for
COPA’s improved efficiency in ensuring SC, as the precise reasoning using the COPA invariants
requires 84% fewer memory accesses to be dynamically guarded by fences.
5.6.3 COPA Framework Overheads
Invariant Checking Overhead The runtime overhead incurred in checking COPA invariants is
only 0.8% relative to the baseline execution on average, having virtually no effect on the perfor-
mance. The likely unreachable code invariants are checked at no cost as their violations are de-
tected upon visiting these code blocks dynamically, and checking likely singleton thread invariants
incur a rather inexpensive check upon thread creation. Checks for likely guarding locks are slightly
more involved but are invoked relatively infrequently upon programmer written synchronization
code.
Recovery Overhead The overhead of recovering the program to conservative SC version via
the JIT de-optimization mechanism is only incurred upon a rare scenario that violates an COPA
invariant. In fact, none of our test programs ever violated an invariant after adequate profiling
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during any dynamic execution. This indicates that our profiling methodology effectively captures
the common-case dynamic execution behaviors of the programs. Furthermore, even if a one-time
recovery occurs during an execution, the recovery cost gets amortized over the entire length of
execution time and the performance can be no worse than that of the best available conservative
SC approach.
5.6.4 Profiling Effort
COPA incurs an additional cost of profiling to learn its program invariants during the offline static
analysis phase. Profiling time depends largely on the number of executions needed to profile stable
invariants and the programs’ typical execution times. Our test programs require profiling times
ranging from 16 minutes to about 2 hours. This profiling is a one-time cost, and is part of the
rigorous software testing efforts as we explained in §5.4.5 and employed for evaluating Apache
Spark. Fig. 5.5 shows how the profiling phase affects the overall benefits of OPT-SC for Spark by

















































Figure 5.5: Result: OPT-SC benefits for Spark with profiling using its test suite: We divide the
mllib-tests inputs into several batches and profile incrementally over each test input batch
with the X axis showing cumulative time spent in profiling. At the end of each batch, we invoke
OPT-SC with all profiled invariants. The blue line along the left vertical axis plots the normalized
execution time overhead; the orange line along the right vertical axis plots the fraction of execu-
tions that encounter an invariant violation. More profiles infer stable invariants, reducing invariant
violation rates, and thereby improving OPT-SC’s runtime overheads.
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We observe that the invariant violation rate is quite high in the beginning but quickly diminishes
to zero after 36 minutes of profiling. This drop in invariant violation means that the program
spends most or all of its execution time in the optimized version with optimistically elided fences.
This results in a significant reduction in runtime overheads starting from 13% after 6 minutes of
profiling down to only 5% in the steady-state when no invariants are violated.
Discussion
OPT-SC vs. volatile-by-default for Java Our work differs from the recent proposal of VBD
semantics for Java [153, 154] in two distinct ways.
First, VBD ensures SC using a conservative safe-by-default approach which incurs a high per-
formance overhead of∼ 30%. We bring down the cost of providing SC using static whole-program
data-flow analyses. While such heavyweight analyses notoriously do not scale well for large con-
current programs using traditional static analyses techniques, we enable this using Optimistic Hy-
brid Analysis thereby inducing much stronger optimizations for providing SC.
Second, the performance overheads of VBD were improved recently using a speculative com-
pilation technique [154]. This approach first elides the fences based on a temporary assumption
that object instances of a given class will not be accessed from multiple threads, and then falls
back to the program version with fences added as soon as any object belonging to the class sees an
access from a different thread. This saves on the synchronization costs for objects of those classes
that are always accessed from a single thread. While VBD speculates at the JVM level, OHA, on
the other hand, optimizes in an offline static analysis framework by assuming a much richer set of
likely program invariants to improve the static reasoning in datarace detection. Although the scope
and cost of OHA recovery is much higher compared to the just-in-time re-compilation for VBD,
an OHA-optimized program execution rarely encounters invariant violations in the steady-state,
whereas every execution of a speculatively compiled program with VBD typically sees several




Recent work has demonstrated the overhead of providing SC semantics for the Haskell program-
ming language to be negligible on commodity hardware [174]. A purely functional programming
language naturally restricts conflicting memory accesses among threads and therefore supporting
and reasoning for SC does not incur high overheads. The results and techniques however do not
extend to imperative languages like Java.
Prior work has achieved end-to-end SC guarantees for Java [175, 176] and C [149, 177] with
high efficiency by combining a cooperative compiler and specialized hardware support. Our work
aims to provide SC at low costs on off-the-shelf commodity hardware by using advanced whole-
program static analysis.
SC compilers for Java [178] and C [179] previously used whole-program delay-set analysis
[180] to determine the required barriers to guarantee SC for a given program, but the performance
overheads remained high. The technique achieved good performance, nearly that of a relaxed
consistency model, when applied to a parallel dialect of Java called Titanium [158] which induces
several language restrictions in order to simplify the reasoning in statically proving data-race-
freedom for many memory accesses. However, the solution is not viable for the vast majority of
programs that do not adhere to the additional language restrictions. Our work brings down the cost
of providing SC for legacy and standard-compliant Java programs without inducing any language
restrictions.
Language-Level Region Serializability
Region serializability provides a stronger memory consistency semantics than SC, whereby the
program is partitioned into disjoint regions, each of which is guaranteed to execute atomically. Re-
gion serializability for C has achieved good performance, however with special-purpose hardware
support [181, 182, 183]. Several works have explored region serializability for Java [184, 185, 186,
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187] achieving good performance, also optimizing using a whole-program static data-race detector
[185]. But these techniques incur high implementation complexity requiring code transformations
to guarantee safe restarts in the event of a deadlock. In contrast, the OHA recovery is rare and fully
leverages the just-in-time compilation features of the JVM.
Summary
We realize an efficient solution to enforcing language-level SC semantics for all programs, even
ones with data-races, without imposing any language-level restrictions. Our approach relies on a
precise static data-race detector to identify the potentially racy instructions and only guard them
via hardware fence operations. Designing a precise static data-race detector remained challenging
due to the fundamental imprecision of traditional static analysis. We address this problem using
a new Cautiously Optimistic Program Analysis (COPA) that induces a significantly more precise
static analysis by assuming likely program invariants. With reasonable profiling effort, the assumed
invariants hold almost during all executions, and the execution can be recovered to a conservative
SC version in the rare instances when they fail. Using this technique, we design a significantly
more precise data-race detector which our OPT-SC compiler for Java uses to enforce SC during




With our critical infrastructures increasingly being modernized, it is essential that the underlying
computer systems provide strong security and reliability guarantees. Well-known dynamic analy-
ses techniques can enforce these security and reliability properties, but the additional work in doing
so often incur prohibitively high performance overheads. So today, most of the industrial software
systems run with relaxed security and reliability guarantees. As software systems grow in scope
and complexity, the need for strong guarantees is over-shadowed by its performance demands.
However, performance is not necessarily at odds with security and reliability guarantees. In
fact, well-behaved software in their correct executions will satisfy all security and safety prop-
erties. Such correct executions should then not require much additional work to check for these
properties. So, the compiler or the language runtime should be able to remove much of the unnec-
essary work. Unfortunately, today’s program analyses techniques are fundamentally conservative
in their reasoning, as they reason for all possible execution states, correct and erroneous alike,
along with many infeasible and rare execution states. This imprecise reasoning means that they
cannot effectively optimize the dynamic analyses overheads.
This dissertation addresses this problem by combining static and dynamic program analyses
in a novel construction of Cautiously Optimistic Program Analysis (COPA). It is founded on two
principles:
Optimistic Analysis leverages assumptions about programs’ dynamic behaviors to significantly
improve the precision of static analyses and thereby reduce the overheads of dynamic analyses.
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It first gathers likely program invariants from dynamic observations, which are properties that
almost always hold in useful dynamic executions but are hard to prove statically. These likely
invariants are then assumed in a predicated static analysis which reasons much more precisely,
thereby identifying and eliding many more unnecessary runtime monitors from the final optimized
dynamic analysis. The resulting system is fast and ensures the correct analysis guarantees in all
executions where the assumed invariants hold true.
Cautious Reasoning additionally ensures analysis soundness in the rare event that an assumed
likely invariant is violated during an execution. The precise results of the predicated static analysis
are carefully used to induce only safe elision optimizations that do not change the analysis metadata
state. Consequently, as long as the invariants hold, the optimized analysis still holds the exact
analysis metadata state as in a conservative analysis. Another important property of the likely
invariants is that their violations can be detected eagerly before they actually take effect. The
analysis state is thus guaranteed to be correct when an invariant violation is detected early, so that
the analysis can recover by simply switching to a conservative analysis and continue forward.
We design a simple forward recovery mechanism for the C language that statically instruments
both the optimistic and conservative analyses versions in separate control flow domains. Later, we
improve this mechanism for Java to leverage just-in-time compilation features.
We demonstrated the utility of COPA in three key results–
• Live Information Flow-based Security Monitoring : Continuous runtime monitoring of informa-
tion flow can enforce several security and privacy policies. However their use is limited to offline
post-mortem analysis due to the prohibitive runtime overheads (> 500% for web/email servers)
of information flow tracking. COPA dramatically reduces this cost (to ∼ 9%) and eliminates the
possibility of rollbacks to make it practical for online security analyses on live software.
• Sound Garbage Collection (GC) for C : Prior GCs for C only work correctly for well-behaved
programs belonging to a subset of the C language, and can incorrectly reclaim memory objects
that are still reachable. We design the first sound GC for C by explicitly tracking provenance of
all pointer information during runtime. The runtime costs of tracking pointers in this manner is
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greatly reduced using COPA. Our PROV-GC tool provides sound GC at only ∼ 16% overhead
for standard-compliant C programs.
• Sequential Consistency (SC) for Java : Current language standards provide weak or no semantics
to a vast majority of concurrent programs with data-races. This severely complicates reasoning
for correctness of programs and compilers leading to obscure bugs. The runtime cost of en-
forcing strong SC semantics however remained high. We leverage COPA to construct a precise
static data-race detector which identifies many likely race-free memory accesses, and our OPT-
SC system applying fences only around the remaining memory accesses incurs a modest ∼ 5%
runtime overhead on x86 hardware.
Future Directions
COPA makes an important contribution– it enables optimistic dynamic analysis without ever in-
curring a rollback. For well-tested software, invariants should rarely fail as profiles would have
captured the common-case program states. However for moderately large software with diverse
features, optimistically gathered invariants may eventually fail when the program encounters un-
profiled behavior. If this happens, COPA incurs a one-way switch to a conservative hybrid analysis.
So, even in the worst case, COPA is still as fast as the best available conservative hybrid technique.
We envision the following strategies to tackle the remaining challenges in deploying COPA.
Continuous Profiling : Although we demonstrate that most of COPA’s benefits can be achieved
from adequate profiling on regression test suites, that may not be viable in many industrial settings.
Moreover, production behaviors may be very different from that explored during in-house testing.
To address these constraints, COPA may be deployed in an active feedback-loop, starting with a
minimal ‘boot-strapping’ process of initial invariants learnt from light-weight profiling. Thereafter,
invariant violations in production can trigger a ‘learning’ phase to include the new behavior and
re-analyze the program. Such a setup removes the need for an extensive a priori profiling phase
and opens the possibility to actively learn new invariants and re-optimize the analysis.
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Incremental Re-analysis : Upon an invariant-failure, instead of switching to the most conser-
vatively optimized analysis, COPA can switch to a less aggressive optimistic analysis that excludes
the failing invariant. If COPA could map assumed invariants to the set of induced optimizations,
it could selectively disable only those optimizations induced by the violated invariant, essentially
re-instrumenting the monitors that were elided by assuming that invariant. However, computing
and then succinctly encoding this invariant-to-optimization mapping is challenging.
Another approach to gracefully handle invariant violations could re-analyze the program with-
out the offending invariant. At first, it would appear to be impractical to recompile for live execu-
tions given the long time spent in static whole-program analysis for complex programs. However,
for many useful static analyses, this can be done incrementally rather than redoing from scratch
[188, 189]. For a dataflow analysis, this boils down to adding new nodes and edges to the pro-
grams’ definition-use graph, and recomputing the transitive closure. Recent work has used incre-
mental pointer analysis to scale whole-program analysis in the context of program modifications
[190], e.g. with dynamic class loading, and this has also been applied to improve performance of
an incremental data-race detector [191]. We believe our COPA analyses can similarly leverage an
incremental construction in the context of invariant failures. And this re-compilation process can
continue in the background while the monitored program runs slowly. Upon completion of the re-
compilation process, the program can switch to the newly optimized analysis at a pre-determined
safe program point. This would enable fast incremental re-analysis of the program upon an invari-
ant violation, so the execution can be recovered to a newly optimized optimistic version instead of
falling back to a conservative version.
Cautiously Optimistic Program Analysis provides a way to realize useful dynamic analyses at
significantly lower overheads without sacrificing analyses’ correctness. Applying this technique
and building upon it in the future can realize practical tools that improve security, reliability and
semantic guarantees for the rapidly growing software systems.
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